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Introduction
When Jack Welch, who is regarded as one of the world's most admired
CEOs,' stepped to the podium on October 30, 2000 to confirm the
t J.D./MBA Candidate, 2005, Cornell Law School, S.C. Johnson Graduate School
of Management; B.A., Occidental College. The author wishes to thank his family,
without whom none of what he as accomplished would have been possible.
1. Michael Skapinker, Survey-World's Most Respected Companies, FIN. TIMES
(London), Dec. 17, 2001, at 2.
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planned merger between General Electric and Honeywell, the deal was gen-
erally seen as the capstone to his brilliant career.2 Delaying a planned
April 2001 retirement until the end of 2001 in order to personally oversee
the acquisition, 3 Welch seemed poised to enhance his already sterling repu-
tation. Facing no significant opposition from the United States Depart-
ment of Justice's Antitrust Division 4 or the Federal Trade Commission, the
U.S. regulators approved the merger with only minor concessions. On July
3, 2001, however, the European Commission dropped a bombshell on
Welch and the rest of the global business community. Unsatisfied with
GE's response to its antitrust concerns, the Commission decided to block
the merger. 5 Welch's "last hurrah" became a footnote in history, dashed by
bureaucrats in Brussels. Without question, the most profound impact of
the blocked merger was that it left other executives around the world ask-
ing the same question: "What next?"'6
Until recently, antitrust and competition policy had not been at the
forefront of international law, largely because it has traditionally been
viewed as a local matter. 7 In the United States, a comprehensive antitrust
policy first emerged in 1890 when the Sherman Act8 "almost completely
federalized American competition law,"9 and offered, for the first time, a
unified national competition policy. Just as U.S. states followed their own
paths on competition policy during the nineteenth century prior to the
Sherman Act, other major industrial nations engaged in independent com-
petition law development, primarily after World War 11.10 Thus, busi-
nesses attempting to operate on a transnational scale quickly found
themselves pushed, pulled, and prodded in myriad directions by local com-
2. See generally GE Plans to Acquire Honeywell for $45 Billion, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2000, at Cl.
3. See id.
4. GE-Honeywell Merger Given Green Light, TORONTO STAR, May 4, 2001. The Jus-
tice Department, concerned over higher prices for the U.S. military, conditioned merger
approval on the divestiture of Honeywell's helicopter engine business and new authori-
zation for third-party maintenance and repair service for some GE-manufactured aircraft
engines. Infra III.B. See also Sarah Stevens, The Increased Aggression of the EC Commis-
sion in Extraterritorial Enforcement of the Merger Regulation and Its Impact on Transatlan-
tic Cooperation in Antitrust, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 263, 274 (2002).
5. David S. Evans, The New Trustbusters, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 14, 14-15 (2002).
6. Id. at 14. Evans argues that "European antitrust regulation could become an
unexpected stumbling block on the road toward a more integrated global economy" and
that "[tlhe EU's opposition to the merger has highlighted the risks that multinational
corporations face as antitrust laws proliferate around the globe." Id. See also Bruce Bar-
nard, Competition Questions Linger, EUR., Sept. 2001(Magazine), at 22 (stating that the
blocked merger "prompted ordinary Americans, and not a few business leaders [ 1, to
ask what right a foreign regulator had to interfere in a deal between two US firms.").
7. Lawrence A. Sullivan & Wolfgang Fikentscher, On the Growth of the Antitrust
Idea, 16 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 197, 197 (1998).
8. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
9. Spencer Weber Walter, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U.
L. REv. 343, 353 (1997).
10. See Lucio Lanucara, The Globalization of Antitrust Enforcement: Governance
Issues and Legal Responses, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 433, 435 (2002).
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petition authorities." In response to these inconsistent laws, "five great
attempts [were] ... made to achieve a true international harmonization of
competition law in the twentieth century." 12 Two former U.S. Assistant
Attorneys General for Antitrust recently proposed a sixth 13 and seventh 14
option. The first five attempts have already failed,' 5 the sixth is likely to
meet the same fate,16 and the seventh remains promising but is yet to be
realized. 17 If anything is clear from these negotiations, it is that regulators
remain conscious of the need for a rational, uniform approach to anti-
trust 18 issues on a global scale. To date, competition authorities have sim-
ply been unable to balance effectively the needs of their own nations
against the greater good of a global policy. This failure comes despite
increased pressure from political and business leaders who want some-
thing more than vague promises of cooperation and a growing legacy of
botched deals. 19
What, though, if a framework was in place to handle mergers that gen-
erated different approval outcomes in different jurisdictions? Imagine a
situation in which the regulatory onus fell primarily on local officials
responding to local concerns, but a standards body operated in the back-
ground to ensure uniformity. This body would work to develop competi-
11. Id. at 438-39.
12. Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law:
Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 557, 558 (1994). The first proposal by the
League of Nations to develop a system of international controls on cartels was never
adopted by the League, largely because of European objection. See Waller, supra note 9,
at 349-50. The International Trade Organization ("ITO"), or "Havana Charter," con-
tained detailed competition law rules and was intended to be the third leg of "a liberal
post-war economic order built on the ITO, the World Bank, and the International Mone-
tary Fund," but was never ratified by the United States. Id. at 350. The third try, a new
version of the ITO, was defeated in the United Nations Economic and Social Council
through a combination of cold war politics and U.S. wavering on the form and sub-
stance of international antitrust. Id. at 350-51. The Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development ("OECD") and the United Nations Conference on Trade
Development ("UNCTAD") both adopted competition codes, but their non-binding
nature made them the fourth and fifth failures, respectively. Id. at 351.
13. See William Sugden, Note, Global Antitrust and the Evolution of an International
Standard, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 989, 990 (2002).
14. See Charles A. James, International Antitrust in the 21st Century: Cooperation
and Convergence, Speech Before the OECD Global Forum on Competition 9 (Oct. 17,
2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9330.pdf (last visited Oct. 8,
2003).
15. Waller, supra note 12, at 558.
16. Sugden, supra note 13, at 992, 996.
17. See James, supra note 14, at 8-11.
18. "Antitrust is an ambiguous term, especially in an international setting. It refers
to a competition policy dealing with business structure and conduct and, more broadly,
with the appropriate role of business in modern life." Sullivan, supra note 7, at 197. As
should already be clear, the term "antitrust" has almost as many meanings as does the
concept. Competition policy, competition law, antitrust policy, and antitrust all seem to
be bandied about as interchangeable with each other, though each can take on a more
specific, nuanced meaning in certain contexts. Unless otherwise noted, I am adopting
this convention and using the terms as perfect substitutes.
19. See, e.g., William J. Kolasky, Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It's a Long
Way from Chicago to Brussels, 10 GEO. MASON L. REv. 533 (2002).
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tion laws that encompassed both the best economic thinking and the real
experiences from regulatory agencies all over the world. The United States,
with one of the oldest national antitrust policies, would be at the same
table as European regulators, who began active regulation only about a dec-
ade ago, as well as nations that are only now beginning to think about
competition policy. As a new global antitrust "common law" developed,
each nation would harmonize its enforcement, if not its substantive law, to
that developed by the standards body. Businesses would finally know
what regulatory burdens to expect in a cross-border transaction and-per-
haps most importantly-increased transparency would encourage regula-
tors to use competition policy as a sword for economic development rather
than as a shield for dying industries. 20 Yet, such a framework does nothing
for mergers contemplated in the long run-up to greater law harmonization.
As such, this standards body must be prepared to fill in the gap and act, at
least temporarily, as a court of last resort.
Such developments, though promising in theory, are still some way
off. If the GE/Honeywell merger represents a period of divergence between
U.S. and European regulators, businesses operating under both regulatory
schemes need something more than promises of future convergence when
contemplating a merger with cross-border implications. Arbitration may
provide an option to bridge the current gap between a contentious reality
and a cooperative future. In the U.S., the use of arbitration for antitrust
disputes in the international commercial context has increased in the past
decade, usually as the result of a contractual arbitration clause.2 1 What if,
when U.S. and European regulators reached differing substantive outcomes
when examining a merger-that is, when one jurisdiction approves a
merger but the other does not-they, in consultation with the affected com-
panies, could submit the merger to arbitration for a final decision? Such
an outcome is not as impossible as it might first appear.
This Note explores some of the major dimensions of international anti-
trust policies, specifically as they relate to the failed GE/Honeywell merger,
and offers a framework for harmonizing global antitrust policies. Part I
examines the differing philosophies on the role of antitrust in regulating
market behavior that has developed on both sides of the Atlantic. Part I
lays the foundation for the discussion of the GE/Honeywell merger by look-
ing at two major antitrust cases predating GE/Honeywell: the 1997 merger
of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas and the 2000 merger of AOL and Time
Warner. Part III examines the GE/Honeywell merger itself, focusing on the
20. See, e.g., Sugden, supra note 13, at 1018. In his article, William Sugden suggests
that many of the overall goals of a more unified antitrust scheme could be accomplished
through greater extraterritorial application of domestic antitrust laws. While true, this
seems like an unfortunate, and duplicative outcome, because it largely preserves the
status quo and offers little more than louder shouts from various regulators.
21. See Eric James Fuglsang, Comment, The Arbitrability of Domestic Antitrust Dis-
putes: Where Does the Law Stand?, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 779, 804-06 (1997). This can be
traced directly to Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985), where the Supreme Court upheld a contractual arbitration clause governing an
international commercial dispute.
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economic rationale provided by European regulators as the basis for their
ultimate decision to block the merger. Part IV discusses some of the les-
sons regulators on both sides of the Atlantic can draw from the failed
merger, while Part V challenges the conventional wisdom by asking
whether the blocked merger has any long-term implications and whether
we really need to do anything to harmonize competition law. Finally, Part
VI develops a proposition that arbitration may represent an effective,
though temporary, way to deal with the vexing problem of cross-border
antitrust integration.
I. The History: Differing Goals, Differing Philosophies
A. Development of Antitrust Law in the United States
Before 1870, the American economy was rather simple: small manu-
facturers, often with only a few employees (who were likely family mem-
bers), purchased raw materials to meet their production needs.2 2
Wholesalers bought the output and sold it to retailers who, in turn, sold
the items to consumers. 23 As urban populations and technology grew,
American industry expanded dramatically. 24 As a result of this growth,
state competition laws could not meet the needs of a national economy and
were confronted with "the worst excesses of national corporations. '2 5 Pub-
lic outcry over the economic power wielded by the industrial magnates 26 of
the late nineteenth century through their massive trust companies 2 7 and
the "popular dissatisfaction and anger at the capacity of these enterprises
to force out rivals and to raise prices to consumers"2 8 triggered legislative
action.
In this environment, the early statutes, which remain the principal
guides for antitrust enforcement in the United States, were drafted quickly,
leaving a tremendous amount of room for judicial interpretation. 29 In
essence, American antitrust laws are designed to guard against any concen-
tration, either through merger, joint venture, or cartel, which will "facilitate
22. See Sullivan & Fikentscher, supra note 7, at 199.
23. Id.
24. Id. Demand led to competition between these rapidly expanding firms and busi-
nesspersons decried the intense downward pressure on prices. Price fixing "pools"-
cartels, in essence-resulted, but "cheating" and new market entrants led industrialists
toward horizontal integration as a means of smoothing out the supply curve and control-
ling prices during weak demand periods. Id.
25. Waller, supra note 9, at 352.
26. Names like Rockefeller, Gould, Vanderbilt, Carnegie, and Fisk are familiar to
anyone with even a basic grounding in U.S. economic and cultural history.
27. DavidJ. Gerber, Competition Law, 50 AM.J. CoMP. L. 263, 268 (Supp. 2002). See
also Sullivan & Fikentscher, supra note 7, at 199-200. The authors point out that trust
companies typically resulted after a market had reached a significant level of horizontal
integration. At that point, the trust would expand vertically, back through inputs and
forward through consumer marketing in an effort to control the entire market from raw
materials to consumer sales. Standard Oil became the prototypical example of this pro-
cess which occurred throughout American industry.
28. Gerber, supra note 27, at 268.
29. Id. at 270.
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collusion, actual or tacit, between the merged firm and the other firms in
the market, '30 with relatively little focus placed on a merger's harm to com-
petitors.31 Section 7 of the Clayton Act 32 sets out the principal test for any
merger or joint venture, stating that it can be held illegal if the effect "may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
33
Similarly, Section 1 of the Sherman Act3 4 provides that "every contract,
combination, in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce . . . is hereby declared to be illegal." 35 Thus, the
primary concern for U.S. antitrust regulators under both the Clayton and
Sherman Acts is whether the merger will result in a market with signifi-
cantly reduced competition.36
Regulators begin an antitrust investigation by looking at the merger's
potential impact on both the market itself and on the combined firm's posi-
tion in the market after the merger.37 Regulators focus on five factors: (1)
whether the merger would result in a concentrated market; (2) whether the
merger generates concerns about a possible decrease in competition; (3)
whether barriers to market entry are low enough to outweigh possible
anticompetitive behavior; (4) whether the merger creates efficiency unob-
tainable by other means; and (5) whether, without the merger, either firm
might fail and ultimately leave the market.38 The resulting structure of the
market after the merger-the number of competitors, the degree of competi-
tion, potential barriers to entry, and the like-is of primary concern to reg-
ulators. 39 Regulators also examine a merger's impact on competitors, but
30. Thomas E. Kauper, Merger Control in the United States and the European Union:
Some Observations, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 305, 320 (2000). See also Sullivan & Finkent-
scher, supra note 7, at 200 (noting that "[tihe constitution the nation knew in 1890 was
atuned [sic] to protect economic opportunity, property, contract, and political liberty
from the excesses of governmental power. Accordingly, antitrust would protect these
same values from the excesses of the new 'autocrat[s] of trade."' See also 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-2 (2000).
31. SeeJames, supra note 14, at 6-7 (stating that "the purpose of the anti-trust laws
'is not to protect business from the working of the market; it is to protect the public from
failure of the market.' Indeed, the competitive process is largely about encouraging the
more efficient to grow at the expense of the less efficient.").
32. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
33. Id.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
35. Id.
36. See Sullivan & Fikentscher, supra note 7, at 200.
37. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES § 0.2 (1992) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES]. The FTC and DOJ
issued MERGER GUIDELINES in order to provide guidance to practitioners on the current
state of antitrust law. The guidelines, however, do not have the force of law and are
designed to "describe[e] the analytical foundations of merger enforcement and provid[e]
guidance [to] enabl[e] the business community to avoid antitrust problems when plan-
ning mergers." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATEMENT
ACCOMPANYING RELEASE OF REVISED MERGER GUIDELINES, reprinted in ABA SECTION OF ANTI-
TRUST LAW, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES 461 (Rob-
ert S. Schlossberg & Clifford H. Aronson eds., 2000) [hereinafter DOJ STATEMENT].
38. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § 0.2.
39. See id.
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only in a peripheral sense.40 Both geographic and product-based markets
are established with each product or service of the merging entities placed
in a different market.4 1 Geographic markets are established for each of the
firms' products by looking for areas where the seller competes and where
the buyer can reasonably turn for supplies.4 2 Product markets include the
products and services that a significant number of consumers would
accept as a substitute if the price of the original product were increased. 43
If any of the products overlap (that is, the firms are direct competitors), the
merger is typically considered horizontal. 44
To understand whether a merger will prompt changes in a product
market, regulators rely on the "small but significant and nontransitory"
increase in price (SSNIP) test to gauge the market's response to a price
increase. 45 "If, in response to the price increase, the reduction in sales of
the product would be large enough that a hypothetical monopolist would
not find it profitable to impose such an increase in price, then the [regula-
tors] will add to the product group the product that is the next-best substi-
tute for the merging firm's product. '4 6  Regulators assume that a
hypothetical monopolist will pursue maximum profits in deciding whether
to raise prices on products under its control and continue the analysis until
a group of products is identified in which a hypothetical monopolist could
"profitably impose at least a 'small but significant and nontransitory'
increase, including the price of a product of one of the merging firms."' 4 7
After establishing the relevant geographic and product markets, regu-
lators calculate the percentage of the market controlled by the merging
firms. This is an important number because higher levels of control are
40. See generally Sullivan & Fikentscher, supra note 7, at 200 (noting that antitrust
seeks to ensure "that the industrial and business processes remain[ I competitive.").
41. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § 1.0.
42. Id. at 70 (analyzing United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963)).
43. Id. at 37-38, 50.
44. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE
ANTITRUST ISSUES 87 (Robert S. Schlossberg & Clifford H. Aronson eds., 2000) [hereinaf-
ter UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES]. In a horizontal merger, regulators are looking
for potential anticompetitive results in the form of "coordinated interaction and unilat-
eral effects." Id. at 87. In contrast, a vertical merger is one that involves "firms at differ-
ent but adjacent levels of production or distribution of a good or service." Id. at 287. In
addition, in a vertical merger the firms are often involved in a supplier-customer relation-
ship. Id. The primary concerns in a vertical merger are the facilitation of collusion and
evasion of rate regulation. Id. at 295. Challenges to vertical mergers are rare under U.S.
law. See id.
45. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § 1.11. The test assumes a lasting five to ten
percent price increase on a product and looks for changes in both consumer behavior
(e.g., buying different products) and supplier response (e.g., increasing the production
of substitute goods). If changes result, the product is included in the scope of the mar-
ket. UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 44, at 49-50.
46. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § 1.11.
47. Id. Regulators "generally will consider the relevant product market to be the
smallest group of products that satisfies this test." Id.
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generally associated with greater market power. 48 Market shares, calcu-
lated by adding and comparing the current annual sales of participants in
a certain market,4 9 are then used to determine the market's Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration, from which regulators
can get a rough idea of the merger's competitive impact on the market.50
This is not to say, however, that authorities rely exclusively on market
shares in deciding whether to challenge mergers. 5 1 In fact, antitrust
authorities have disavowed exclusive reliance on market shares in favor of a
more "reasoned analysis of the likely competitive effect of the particular
transaction."5 2 The Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) recognize that the competitive effects of a merger cannot be
determined solely based on market concentration, 53 a position consistent
with the decision in United States v. General Dynamics Corp.54 Authorities
also consider several other factors, including ease of entry into the market,
48. See UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 44, at 79. Market power is
generally viewed as a firm's ability to set prices unilaterally or to cooperate with other
firms to set prices in oligopolistic competition. Id. at 79, 95-96.
49. See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501 (1974)
(stating that "[e]vidence of the amount of annual sales is relevant as a prediction of
future competitive strength"). Annual sales from previous years may be used if, for some
reason, current sales do not accurately reflect the market. UNDERSTANDING THE ANTI-
TRUST ISSUES, supra note 44, at 80-81.
50. See UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 44, at 84-85. "The HHI is
calculated by summing the squares of the individual market shares" of all firms in the
market. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § 1.5. This number ranges from near zero
(no firm has more than a negligible share of the market) to 10,000 (one firm controls
the entire market). UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 44, at 85. A market
with an HHI below 1000 is seen as unconcentrated and a merger is unlikely to have a
significant impact. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § 1.51(a). If the HHI is between
1,000 and 1,800, the market is considered moderately concentrated. Id. § 1.51(b).
Mergers that produce an HHI increase of less than 100 points in this segment are seen as
unlikely to have competitive impacts, but mergers that result in an HHI increase of over
100 points raise significant competitive concerns. Id. Markets with an HHI of 1,800 or
more are considered highly concentrated and an HHI increase of 50 points or more
raises competitive concerns. Id. § 1.51(c). For example, if one imagines a market with
four participants, each with a market share of twenty five percent, the HHI is 2,500 (252
+ 252 +252 + 252 = 2,500). This market is considered highly concentrated and a merger
that results in an HHI increase of over fifty points (which involves a very small change in
market share by one competitor in this example and is certain if two of these firms
merge) is of strong concern to regulators. Larger firms have a greater proportionate
weight than smaller firms in the calculation, allowing regulators to get a better feel for
the potential collusive effect of larger firms. Thus, a market of four firms with 50, 20,
20, and 10 market shares generates an HHI of 3,400 (502 + 202 + 202 + 102 = 3,400).
This 900 point difference from the equally balanced market shows the greater potential
of the firm with the largest market share to engage in anticompetitive behavior. UNDER-
STANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 44, at 85. The DOJ or FTC have typically
challenged mergers in highly concentrated markets where the HHI change is more than
100 points. Id. at 94-95.
51. See UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 44, at 93.
52. 60 Minutes with the Honorable James F. Rill, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 229, 235 (1992) (emphasis
omitted).
53. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § 1.52.
54. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 503-04; see infra notes 63, 67 and accompa-
nying text.
Vol. 37
2004 Addressing the Failed GE/Honeywell Merger
the possibility of a failure by one of the firms, merger-related efficiencies,
and market or product characteristics that make collusion especially
likely.55
Key to any merger analysis under U.S. law is the concept of merger-
related (or merger-generated) efficiencies. 5 6 According to the DOJ and
FTC, "the primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their efficiency-
enhancing potential."'5 7 Economic analysis has played an increasingly large
role in merger analysis over the past thirty years and considerably changed
judicial and administrative attitudes about the role of efficiencies in merger
review. 58 Broadly defined, an efficiency is something that increases the
value of society's economically measurable assets. 5 9 Mergers can result in
efficiencies "by permitting a better utilization of existing assets, enabling
the combined firm to achieve lower costs in producing a given quantity and
quality than either firm could have achieved without the proposed transac-
tion."60 Efficiencies can actually enhance competition and result in lower
prices. 6 1 Merging parties routinely offer evidence of the merger-specific
reasons for having an incentive to lower prices, using these efficiencies
(and their associated cost savings) to counterbalance incentives they might
have to raise prices.
62
In sum, U.S. merger law focuses almost exclusively on the market, ask-
ing whether the merger will dampen competition in any segment, regard-
less of whether the merger creates a single dominant entity.
63
55. Lisa M. Renzi, Comment, The GE/IHoneywell Merger: Catalyst in the Transnational
Conglomerate Merger Debate, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 109, 122 (2002).
56. See UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 44, at 143.
57. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § 4 (emphasis added).
58. See Charles A. James, Antitrust in the Early 21st Century: Core Values and Con-
vergence, Address at the Program on Antitrust Policy in the 21st Century 13, 15 (May
15, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/11148.pdf (last visited Oct.
11, 2003).
59. See UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 44, at 143.
60. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (revised 1997) [hereinafter revised MERGER GUIDELINES].
61. Id. The Merger Guidelines give an example of two high cost competitors combin-
ing to form one low cost competitor.
62. See Donna E. Patterson & Carl Shapiro, Transatlantic Divergence in GE/Honey-
well: Causes and Lessons, ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 18, 21. This is known as the "efficien-
cies defense."
63. Stefan Schmitz, How Dare They? European Merger Control and the European Com-
mission's Blocking of the General Electric/Honeywell Merger, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
325, 339 (2002). It is entirely possible, then, for a merger to garner approval even if the
resulting company holds a dominant position in the market, so long as sufficient compe-
tition remains at the end of the day. This is primarily accomplished by showing that a
significant number of non-market factors, such as ease of entry, efficiencies, and chang-
ing market conditions, survive the merger, and these are generally viewed as sufficient to
rebut a prima facie showing of concentration in the post-merger market. See Donald I.
Baker, United States of America, in INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 447,
455 (J. William Rowley & Donald I. Baker eds., 1991). In United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a showing of high
concentration in the coal market, based on past coal production and sales figures, was
insufficient, standing alone, to conclude that a merger between two leading producers of
coal would, by contributing to concentration, substantially lessened competition.
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What this means is that while any conduct that eliminates or disadvantages
rivals may in some sense reduce competition, "reduction of competition
does not invoke the [antitrust laws] until it harms consumer welfare"-that
is, "when it harms both allocative efficiency and raises the prices of goods
above competitive levels or diminishes their quality."6 4
Perhaps the most quoted line in American antitrust jurisprudence is
that antitrust laws are concerned with the "protection of competition, not
competitors."65 As such, regulators focus on the impact a merger will have
on consumers, not on competitors,6 6 making a firm's potential to dominate
a market the primary concern.67 Antitrust laws, however, are not seen as a
Instead, the Court found that the competition for new coal contracts and the amount of
available coal reserves in the post-merger market was the proper metric for gauging
future market effect. See id. at 501-03; see also United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908
F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (providing that "[e]vidence of market concentration sim-
ply provides a convenient starting point for a broader inquiry into future competitive-
ness; the Supreme Court has never indicated that a defendant seeking to rebut a prima
facie case is restricted to producing evidence of ease of entry. Indeed, in numerous
cases, defendants have relied entirely on non-entry factors in successfully rebutting a
prima facie case.").
64. William J. Kolasky & Janet Ridge, United States: Summary of US Antitrust Laws,
INT'L FIN. L. REV., Apr. 2001, at 159, 159 (Supp. 2001) (quoting Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995)).
65. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis added).
This corresponds with the classical economic idea that competitive and open markets
would assure the common welfare. Sullivan, supra note 7, at 197.
66. See generally Kauper, supra note 30, at 320 (noting that "the base concern has
consistently been with price setting by groups of firms"); see also Krzysztof Kuik, Recent
Developments in EU/US Trade Relations, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 433, 442 (2002)("Viewed in a nutshell, the United States antitrust policy has focused ... on a single goal
of increased economic efficiency leading to an increase in consumer welfare."); ROBERT
H. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 89 (1978) ("Whether one looks at the texts of the
antitrust statutes, the legislative intent behind them, or the requirements of proper judi-
cial behavior .... the case is overwhelming for judicial adherence to the single goal of
consumer welfare in the interpretation of the antitrust laws.").
67. See Schmitz, supra note 63, at 339. In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963), the Supreme Court held that when a merger "produces a firm
controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant
increase in the concentration of firms in that market," a presumption of illegality exists.
In Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, a combined market share of thirty percent was sufficient to
generate that presumption. Id. at 364. The Court then embarked on over ten years of
analysis under this framework, resulting in the following decisions: United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 302 (1966) (upholding the blocking of a merger where
the combination would have resulted in a combined market share of 7.5%); United
States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 551 (1966) (upholding a blocked merger
where the combined shares totaled 4.49% nationwide, 11.32% in a three-state area, and
23.95% in Wisconsin); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964)
(upholding a blocked merger between a firm with 27.8% of the market and a firm with
1.3% of the market). In United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974),
the Court pulled back from this presumption of illegality when it found that static mar-
ket shares could not generate an accurate picture of future market power and allowed a
merger that resulted in a combined market share of fifteen percent. See id. at 486.
Today, because of General Dynamics, the analysis of market domination has returned to
the fundamental concern over the avoidance of collusion. See Kauper, supra note 30, at
325. As a result, the courts have upheld mergers like that at issue in United States v.
Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984), in which a merger that resulted in a
combined market share of over fifty percent was approved because ease of entry into the
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way to "protect competitors from mergers that will make the merged firm
more efficient,"'68 because competition is seen as the best way to promote
efficiency. Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers put it this way:
"the goal is efficiency, not competition. The ultimate goal is that there be
efficiency." 69 A recent Supreme Court decision is illustrative:
The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from the
workings of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the
market. The law directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even
severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition
itself.70
This language goes a long way in explaining the underlying rationale
of American antitrust law.
B. Development of Antitrust Law in the European Union
Competition policy in Europe is more policy-oriented, with "market
integration, consumer welfare, and [the] creati[on of] a level[ ]playing
field" considered more important than under U.S. law.7 1 Current law is
based largely on the German concept of competition policy adopted after
World War 11.72 The German system rested on the principle that individ-
ual market participants would compete with each other while the state
stood in the background to ensure that competition remained viable.
73
Seeking primarily to protect competitors from dominant firms, both the
German and now the European Union systems focus on whether or not a
merger will result in a dominant position. 74 Competition law also devel-
market generated substantially less fear about the impact of collusion on prices. Id. t
978-79.
68. Kolasky, supra note 19, at 5.
69. Lawrence H. Summers, Competition Policy in the New Economy, 69 ANTITRUST L.J.
353, 358 (2001).
70. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
71. Kuik, supra note 66, at 442.
72. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 338 n.64.
73. See id. Interestingly, the German model originally called for competition com-
pletely free of government influence (and interference). See id. at 337.
[Clurrent European merger control is to a large extent based on the German
concept of competition law and German law, in turn, has been largely influ-
enced by the so-called ordoliberal schools of thought. Originally, it was believed
that every individual should enjoy economic freedom as part of his political
freedom and that, therefore, competition should be completely free from any
form of government interference. However, this belief was based on the assump-
tion that individuals competed with one another-as was the case in the early- to
mid-eighteenth century. The Industrial Revolution in the late-nineteenth cen-
tury ended this situation because the market became increasingly the playing
field of large entities. These entities sometimes became so strong that competi-
tors were driven out of the market and effective competition was eliminated.
German ordoliberals therefore propagated a system where the market players
would freely compete with each other, while the State would guarantee and pro-
vide for an order or constitution according to which such competition is and
remains possible.
Id. at 337-38.
74. See id. at 338.
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oped around a unique set of political incentives: European Community reg-
ulators initially needed a way to break down national borders in order to
promote the European common market, and cross-border mergers were an
effective means of promoting this goal.75 The EU tends to focus more on
continuous and balanced expansion rather than simply looking for
anticompetitive behavior.7 6 As such, the EU is much more willing to relax
competition policy in areas that are foreign to U.S. regulators. 77 In general,
the EU system is based primarily on examining mergers to ensure that they
do not significantly restrict competition and serve the needs and interests
of the Community. 78 It can be said that competition law is a tool of eco-
nomic integration in Europe, while it is a product of such integration in the
United States. 79
The predecessor to the European Union, the European Economic
Community, instituted broad antitrust regulations in 1962, but the EU did
not enter a period of "activist" enforcement until 199080 when it adopted
the European Merger Control Regulation (hereinafter EMCR) 8 1 requiring
companies to prenotify the European Commission of major acquisitions. 8 2
Before the EMCR, mergers were governed by EC Articles 81 and 82,83
which established only general competition rules.84 The EMCR central-
75. Waller, supra note 9, at 353.
76. Id. Professor Waller draws the interesting parallel that antitrust laws in the
European Union played a role similar to that of the Commerce Clause in American law.
77. Id. at 353-54. For example, the EU will overlook merger barriers where a
merger will strengthen or promote further integration of the Community and yet pro-
hibit otherwise acceptable vertical agreements if they maintain national boundaries.
78. Id. at 354.
79. Id. at 355.
80. Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., The Global Antitrust Explosion: Safeguarding Trade and Com-
merce or Runaway Regulation?, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 59, 60 (2002).
81. Council Regulation 4064/89, 1990 OJ. (L395/1), amended by Council Regula-
tion 1310/97, 1997 OJ. (L180) 1 [hereinafter Council Regulation].
82. Lipsky, supra note 80, at 60.
83. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, OJ.
(C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF AMSTERDAM]. The main problems with Articles
81 and 82 were that they lacked "express language applicable to corporate mergers."
Jeffrey M. Peterson, Comment, Unrest in the European Commission: The Changing Land-
scape and Politics of International Mergers for United States Companies, 24 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 377, 384-85 (2002). The EC and the European Court of Justice attempted to com-
pensate for this shortcoming by broadly interpreting the articles in order to give life to
the goal of preserving competitive market structures. Alessandro Bertolini & Francesco
Parisi, The Rise of Structuralism in European Merger Control, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 13, 17
(1996). The provisions, however, were viewed as corrective, rather than preventative.
Because European firms were often suboptimal in size, mergers were viewed as a viable
way of achieving efficient operating levels and there was a strong presumption of legiti-
macy in favor of corporate mergers. As such, absent abuse of a dominant position, no
intervention before 1990 was the result of a solely structural analysis of the market or
from the calculation of a so-called concentration index. Id. at 17.
84. For support, Schmitz cites Case 6/72 Europemballage Corp. v. Commission,
1973 E.C.R. 215, 1973 C.M.L.R. 1999 and Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, British Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4487, 2 C.M.L.R. 551 (1987). See Schmitz,
supra note 63, at 329 n.23. In addition, for Article 82 to apply, the EC had to show that
one of the merging parties already had a dominant position in a relevant market before it
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ized antitrust enforcement, pulling it away from a complicated (and largely
unworkable) mixture of general EC laws and national regulations that were
often unenforced either because local regulators lacked substantive legal
control to block a merger they viewed as harmful, or because politicians
did not want to get involved in major acquisitions.8 5 In a sense, competi-
tion policy in the EC until 1990 was very much like it was in the United
States until 1890: ineffective and subject to a great variety of differing local
laws. 86 Designed from the start to rectify this problem,8 7 the EMCR
replaced Articles 81 and 82 as the only Community-wide standard. Now,
the EMCR preempts national laws, providing a uniform body of laws to
govern the approval of a given transaction.8 8
Under the EMCR, regulators focus on two factors: concentration and
what the Europeans call turnover,8 9 which is the amount derived from sell-
ing products and providing services. 90 A concentration results when "(a)
two or more previously independent undertakings merge; or (b) one or
more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or one or more
undertakings acquire ... direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of
one or more other undertakings."9 1 Concentrations have a "community
dimension" sufficient to come within the purview of the EMCR only if the
combined aggregate turnover is more than five billion euros and the Com-
munity-wide aggregate of at least two of the companies is greater than two
hundred and fifty million euros.92 Assuming the merger meets these statu-
tory requisites, the Commission then examines the merger to ensure that it
is compatible with the common market 93 and that the merged company
could challenge the merger. See Thomas L. Ruffner, Note, The Failed GE/Honeywell
Merger: The Return of Portfolio-Effects Theory?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1285, 1291 (2003); see
also Bertolini & Parisi, supra note 83, at 20.
85. See Kauper, supra note 30, at 311. Regulators also were forced to accommodate
the desire to form an integrated common market, resulting, at least initially, in discount-
ing the fear that mergers would create anticompetitive effects in the market. See
Bertolini & Parisi, supra note 83, at 16.
86. Waller, supra note 9, at 352-54.
87. See Peterson, supra note 83, at 385-86. Passage of the EMCR was, like many
things in the EU, the result of a prolonged battle over various national interests. Id. at
386. Smaller states that lacked effective merger controls wanted tougher regulations,
while those states with advanced domestic regulatory frameworks (specifically Germany
and United Kingdom) were more reluctant to cede their merger control to Brussels. See
William Elland, The Mergers Control Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, 11 EUR. COMPETMON
L. REv. 111, 111 (1990).
88. Peterson, supra note 83, at 386.
89. See Council Regulation, supra note 81, art. 1.
90. See id. art. 5; see Commission Notice on Calculation of Turnover Under Council
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings,
1998 OJ. (C66/25). On a more general level, turnover can be thought of simply as total
sales. See id. for a further discussion of exactly how turnover is calculated.
91. Council Regulation, supra note 81, art. 3(1).
92. See id. art. 1(2). Note that the five billion euro mark is a global aggregate and
includes revenues earned outside of Europe. See Peterson, supra note 83, at 387.
93. Specifically, the Commission's mandate is to take into account "the need to pre-
serve and develop effective competition within the common market in view of, among
other things, the structure of all the markets concerned and the actual or potential com-
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does not "create or strengthen a dominant position."9 4 Dominance in EU
case law is defined as "a position of economic strength enjoyed by an
undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being main-
tained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers[,] and
ultimately of the consumers."9 5 So long as a concentration "does not cre-
ate or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective compe-
tition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a
substantial part of it," the merger is compatible with the common mar-
ket.9 6 By contrast, a concentration creating or strengthening a dominant
position that does significantly impede effective competition is incompati-
ble with the common market.9 7
As in the United States, European regulators first establish the markets
in which the merging firms will compete, both geographically and by prod-
uct.98 Geographic markets must include the "common market or . . . a
substantial part of it."9 9 Product markets typically include products in
direct competition but can also include products that act as substitutes on
either the supply or demand side.10 0 In 1997, the Commission' 0 1 began to
encourage the use of the SSNIP test,10 2 but it is unclear how much impact
this is having on regulatory decisions.10 3 After defining the market, the
Commission looks at a variety of factors, including market shares, ease of
entry into the market, efficiencies, and the ability to bundle products in
packages 10 4 to evaluate the firm's dominance in a particular market.' 0 5
Although market shares are important, they are not analyzed with the same
primacy as in the U.S.; 10 6 that is, other factors can play a larger role in the
petition from undertakings located either within or without the Community." 'Council
Regulation, supra note 81, art. 2(1)(a).
94. Id. art. 2(3).
95. Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461,
462.
96. Council Regulation, supra note 81, art. 2(2).
97. See id. art. 2(3).
98. Renzi, supra note 55, at 115-16.
99. Council Regulation, supra note 81, art. 2(2).
100. Renzi, supra note 55, at 116. The importance of market definition should not be
underestimated, for as Professor Korah states, a "wide definition will usually indicate a
smaller market share which understates the firm's market power." VALENTINE KORAH, AN
INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 83 (7th ed. 2000). Thus,
the more narrowly a market is defined, and the more the Commission includes substi-
tutes in its analysis, the easier it is to find an abuse of a dominant position. See id.
84-85.
101. See Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purposes of
Community Competition Law, 1997 OJ. (C 372) 5.
102. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
103. Indeed, Professor Korah states unequivocally that the "test is flawed when it is
applied to articles 81 or 82." KORAH, supra note 100, at 87, 91.
104. For a fuller discussion on bundling, see infra Parts II.C-D and IV.A.
105. See KORAH, supra note 100, at 309-15; Michael Reynolds & Elizabeth
Weightman, European Union of European Economic Area, in I INTERNATIONAL MERGERS:
THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 449, 458 (J. William Rowley & Donald I. Baker eds., 2d ed.
1996).
106. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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decision to accept or reject a merger. 10 7 "One possibly perverse feature of
the E.C. law is that efficiencies, which in the USA may justify a merger that
reduces competition somewhat, are treated in the opposite way under the
[EMCR]."' 10 8
In sum, European merger law is primarily concerned with the impact
of a merger on competitors (especially smaller firms) rather than on con-
sumers. 10 9 If a merger is going to create or strengthen a dominant position
in a market, such that the merger might result in other firms being driven
from the market, it is unlikely to gain much favor with European regula-
tors.1 10 G6tz Drauz, Director of the Merger Task Force for the European
Commission, nicely illustrates this point:
While there is nothing wrong in admitting that the competitive process is
about encouraging the more efficient firms to grow at the expense of the less
efficient, it might be prudent for antitrust authorities not to unconditionally
adopt such a Darwinian theory, whereby competitors that are unable or
unwilling to meet the new competitive environment created through a con-
glomerate merger would have to leave the market. ... This argument, how-
ever, disregards the realities of certain markets, where market exit may not
be followed by new entry. In such a case, protecting the competitive struc-
ture of an industry should not be confused with the protection of inefficient
competitors. This was precisely the case with the GE/Honeywell merger,
where high entry barriers and very long industrial cycles did not favor entry.
Once rivals are marginalized or expelled from the market, they would remain
in that position on a lasting basis. 111
C. Putting the Two Together
Merger regulations in the U.S. and Europe remain the product of dif-
ferent forces. 112 The rise of trusts like Standard Oil prompted Congress to
step in and fundamentally regulate the structure of the market. 113 From
the beginning, American policy has been mostly consumed with the fear
that mergers would create collusion between market players.114 Especially
in areas where concentration is high, the concern is that one or two firms
will be able to dominate the market to such an extent that they can, even
without actual collusion, dictate prices regardless of market forces. 1 5 The
actual position of the individual market player relative to others in the mar-
107. See Kopu-i, supra note 100, at 310-11.
108. Id. at 312. This is especially true if one views competition law as primarily
concerned with ultimately, protecting consumers.
109. See id. at 80. ("The preamble to the treaty refers to many factors other than
efficiency, such as social policy, fair competition, small and medium-sized undertak-
ings, peace and liberty.")
110. See Renzi, supra note 55, at 117.
111. G6tz Drauz, Unbundling GE/Honeywell: The Assessment of Conglomerate Mergers
Under EC Competition Law, 25 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 885, 904 (2002).
112. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 337-39.
113. Id. at 338.
114. Kauper, supra note 30, at 320.
115. Id.; see Kolasky, supra note 19, at 3-4 (stating that the DOJ challenges mergers
when "they eliminate a competitor and may thereby enable the merged firm to restrict
output and raise price.").
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ket only provides evidence of concentration and is not dispositive. 116
In Europe, by contrast, the focus is on the "creation or strengthening
of the dominant position of a single firm."'117 This focus, almost by neces-
sity, requires looking at the impact a merger will have on other market
players. 18 Interestingly, European regulators also use noneconomic fac-
tors, such as political and social considerations, when passing judgment
on a merger-a marked contrast to the United States' approach. 1 9 To sum-
marize, European regulators are concerned with a single firm rising to a
dominant position, while American regulators are more averse to a group
of firms coming together to impede the market.' 20 To put it another way,
market dominance by one competitor is the starting point of any merger
investigation in Europe, whereas market concentration is the starting point
in the U.S. 12 1
Setting aside varying definitions of "market dominance," the EMCR is
primarily concerned with the ability of competitors to compete in the same
market as the merged firms. 122 The focus is on measuring harm to the
competitors of a merged firm, rather than on harm to the market itself.' 23
This focus makes it significantly more difficult to incorporate productive
efficiencies into the merger calculus, since a merger that creates substantial
efficiencies is likely to strengthen a dominant position. 124 Indeed, in at
least one case, the Commission referred to efficiency gains (economics of
scale) as evidence of the strengthening of a dominant position. 125 Some
EC officials have gone as far as to say that "once a dominant position or
strengthening of a dominant position is found, efficiencies are not
considered."'1 2
6
The United States takes the opposite approach and focuses on the
impact a merger will have on consumers (the market), rather than the
impact it will have on competitors. 127 If a merger can generate efficiencies,
this can weigh heavily toward approval, 128 because efficiencies invariably
116. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 339.
117. Kauper, supra note 30, at 320.
118. See Kolasky, supra note 19, at 4.
119. See Ruffner, supra note 84, at 1302.
120. See Kauper, supra note 30, at 320; see also Eric S. Hochstadt, Note, The Brown
Shoe of European Union Competition Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 296 n.39 (2002).
121. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 339; see Hochstadt, supra note 120, at 316 n.104.
122. Kauper, supra note 30, at 321-22; Ruffner, supra note 84, at 1300.
123. Kauper, supra note 30, at 321-22; see Kolasky, supra note 19, at 5 ("[It is well
established under U.S. law that the antitrust laws do not protect competitors from merg-
ers that will make the merged firm more efficient, even if they fear they may as a result
be forced from the market." (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104
(1986)).
124. Kauper, supra note 30, at 322; see also Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 63, at 21.
125. Case IV/M.382 Philips/Grundig, 1993 OJ. (C 336) 11. The merger was ulti-
mately approved.
126. Kauper, supra note 30, at 356 n.240.
127. Id. at 322; see Ruffner, supra note 84, at 1300.
128. Revised MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 60, § 4. However, the revised MERGER
GUIDELINES make it clear that "fe]fficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly
or near monopoly." Id. § 4. Typically, only those efficiencies that cannot be achieved
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lead to lower prices, a fundamentally procompetitive outcome. 129 Accord-
ing to one member of the FTC, "it is fair to say that the EC focuses more on
single firm dominance and the U.S. focuses more on oligopoly
coordination."' 130
II. Differences Illustrated: Recent Cases
Before the GE/Honeywell merger, the United States and the EU wran-
gled over two significant and illustrative mergers: the 1997 merger of Boe-
ing and McDonnell Douglas 13 ' and the 2000 merger of AOL and Time
Warner.132
A. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, both large aerospace and defense
suppliers, agreed to merge in December 1996.133 The firms were direct
competitors (and two of only three remaining manufacturers worldwide) in
the market for large, commercial jet aircraft. 13 4 At the time of the merger,
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas controlled approximately seventy percent
of the world market for such aircraft, 135 though Boeing itself accounted for
sixty-four percent of the market.13 6 Despite the resulting high level of con-
centration, the FTC did not challenge the combination, finding that
McDonnell Douglas' future was dim and that "[ilts current market share
considerably overstated its future potential" in the aircraft sector.' 3 7 Thus,
the FTC did not believe that McDonnell Douglas could exercise any influ-
ence in the market, noting that "[i]t no longer had a chance to receive any
orders for a large aircraft and no economically plausible strategy could
change this situation."'138 The FTC did express some concern over long-
by anything short of a merger will be considered, and even then, the actual impact that
the efficiency argument has with regulators is open to debate. See Kauper, supra note
30, at 353. For a list of cases in which courts have examined and either rejected or
recognized efficiency claims, see id. at 353 n.232.
129. See Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 63, at 20-21; see also Hochstadt, supra note
120, at 327 (stating that "modern U.S. antitrust law has generally focused on one goal-
the maximization of consumer welfare").
130. Debra A. Valentine, Building a Cooperative Framework for Oversight in Mergers-
The Answer to Extraterritorial Issues in Merger Review, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 525, 528
(1998).
131. See generally Schmitz, supra note 63, at 359.
132. See generally id. at 362.
133. Thomas L. Boeder, The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger, in ANTITRUST GOES
GLOBAL 139, 140 (Simon J. Evenett et al. eds., 2000).
134. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 359. The third is Airbus, one of the larger success
stories in European economic integration. See generally AIRBus, AIRBUs TODAY, at http://
www.airbus.com/about/history.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
135. Kauper, supra note 30, at 339.
136. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 359.
137. Kauper, supra note 30, at 339. See Boeing Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) '124,295,
at 24,123 (FTCJuly 1, 1997). Kauper points out that FTC's analysis of the merger rested
on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S.
486 (1974).
138. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 360.
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term supply contracts that Boeing had with a number of airlines and the
potential that these contracts could potentially deny Airbus equal access to
the market. 13 9 Ultimately, though, the Commission felt that the potential
for Boeing to foreclose Airbus from the market through these contracts
could be better examined in a separate proceeding. 140 Throughout its
investigation, the FTC primarily focused on the potential for adverse
impacts on consumers (in this case, airlines purchasing airplanes from the
merged companies). 14 1 As is customary in U.S. merger review, the FTC
conducted its investigation in private, with the only substantive commen-
tary coming from the post-review decision to permit the merger.1
4 2
European authorities, by contrast, conducted a highly political and
very public review, with the EU's top competition official, Karel Van Miert,
giving frequent interviews and speeches on the merits of the transac-
tion. 143 The European Commission focused its investigation much more
heavily on the possible adverse affects on Airbus and on advantages Boeing
might have over Airbus as a result of the merger. 144 The Commission gave
considerable weight to evidence submitted by Airbus. 14 5 This is in stark
contrast to U.S. practice, which tends to disfavor submissions by a competi-
tor seeking to block a merger. 14 6 The Commission did not consider
McDonnell Douglas's future competitive potential as a factor in its analy-
sis. 1 4 7 However, the Commission found the increase in Boeing's market
power through the acquisition, 148 as well as Boeing's exclusive supplier
contracts, relevant in gauging Airbus's ability to compete effectively.
149
Ultimately, the Commission did allow the merger to proceed on the condi-
139. Kauper, supra note 30, at 339; see also Boeing Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at
24,124.
140. Kauper, supra note 30, at 339-40.
141. Boeder, supra note 133, at 141.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 142. At one point, Van Miert declared that the transaction would be
rejected without major concessions and specifically detailed the concessions that would
be demanded. Id.
144. Id.
145. Kauper, supra note 30, at 340. The Commission based most of its market share
analysis on data submitted by Airbus. See also Commission Decision of 30 July 1997
Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the Common Market and the Functioning
of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.877 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas), 1997 OJ. (L
336) 16, para. 29 [hereinafter Boeing/McDonnell Douglas].
146. Boeder, supra note 133, at 142.
147. Kauper, supra note 30, at 340. Professor Kauper questions whether the so-called
General Dynamics factors play any significant role under the European Merger
Regulation.
148. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 360. The acquisition of McDonnell Douglas would
give Boeing access to eighty-five airlines that did not operate Boeing aircraft but did
operate either McDonnell Douglas aircraft exclusively or a combination of McDonnell
Douglas and Airbus aircraft. Id.
149. Kauper, supra note 30, at 340. See also Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, supra note
145, para. 43-46, 54(e). The Commission was especially concerned that a broader
product range, greater financial resources, and higher capacity might influence airlines
into entering such exclusive deals in the future. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 361.
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tion that Boeing eliminate its exclusive contracts. 150
This case illustrates the strong substantive differences in antitrust
analysis between the United States and Europe, primarily through the dif-
ferent focuses on harm to competitors in the analysis. 15 1 It also shows
how nebulous the "compatibility with the common market" standard really
is, as neither Boeing nor McDonnell Douglas was a European company and
neither had production assets inside the EU. 15 2 Despite this reason for not
getting involved, the EU felt justified in overseeing the merger. 15 3
B. AOL/Time Warner
AOL, an Internet access and content provider, and Time Warner, a
media conglomerate with significant print and broadcast holdings, agreed
to merge in early 2000.154 Neither a horizontal nor vertical merger, the
combination fell in the vast gray area known as "conglomerate merg-
ers."'155 The FTC expressed concerns that the merger could have a chilling
impact on the high-speed broadband Internet and interactive television
markets through the combination of AOL's subscriber base and Time
Warner's cable network. 15 6 More specifically, the merger would give AOL/
Time Warner control over a vast amount of the cable network infrastruc-
ture in the United States, 15 7 a primary delivery mechanism for high-speed
Internet services, which is "widely expected to be the pipeline for all future
home digital entertainment."15 8 According to the FTC, the concern was
that "'these two powerful companies would create barriers that would
injure competitors of Time Warner and competitors of AOL. ' ''159 U.S.
approval came only after the two companies agreed to allow other Internet
service providers ("ISPs") access to Time Warner's network, to continue
150. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, supra note 145, para. 116. Boeing also had to main-
tain McDonnell Douglas as an independent company for ten years and provide customer
support for McDonnell Douglas aircraft at the same level as for Boeing aircraft. Schmitz,
supra note 63, at 361.
151. See generally Boeder, supra note 133, at 142-43. At least one commentator has
pointed out, though, that the unique nature of the industry and the strong parties on
either side (specifically, Boeing and Airbus) mean that this merger will ultimately have
only limited application in gauging future outcomes. See id. at 139.
152. Stevens, supra note 4, at 266.
153. Id. at 266.
154. See James M. Turner, Note, Mega Merger, Mega Problems: A Critique of the Euro-
pean Community's Commission on Competition's Review of the AOL/Time Warner Merger,
17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 131, 133 (2001).
155. See id. at 135-36. Combinations of firms with relationships that are neither
horizontal nor vertical characterize conglomerate mergers. See also UNDERSTANDING THE
ANrITRUST ISSUES, supra note 44, at 307. In FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568
(1967), the Supreme Court characterized a conglomerate merger as "one in which there
are no economic relationships between the acquiring and the acquired firm." Id. at 577
n.2.
156. See Michael Stroh, FTC Clears Union of AOL, Time Warner, BALT. SUN, Dec. 15,
2000, at IA.
157. At the time, Time Warner was the second largest cable provider in the U.S., serv-
ing over 12.6 million homes. Id.
158. Id.; see also Turner, supra note 154, at 164-65.
159. Stroh, supra note 156 (quoting Robert Pitofsky, then chairman of the FTC).
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development of digital subscriber line ("DSL") technology (an alternative
to cable-based Internet access) in Time Warner cable markets, and to not
interfere with content offered by other providers on Time Warner's
network. 16
0
In Europe, the Commission initially cited similar concerns over the
potential for Internet access domination.' 6 ' Although finding that AOL
was the only ISP present in most EU member states, 16 2 further investiga-
tion revealed that both companies lacked a broadband infrastructure suffi-
cient to dominate the European broadband Internet market.' 63 After
reaching this conclusion, the Commission identified a new area of con-
cern: the possibility that AOL/Time Warner could dominate what it
termed "the emerging market for Internet music delivery on-line."'16 4 The
online music industry is a two-part market, comprising music players and
music catalogues. 165 AOL's music player, Winamp, uses both proprietary
and nonproprietary formats, 166 and the Commission was concerned that
access to this proprietary format could "tempt" AOL/Time Warner into
making its music only available for its Winamp player. 167 As for the music
catalogues, AOL had an existing promotion and distribution relationship
with Bertelsmann AG, Europe's leading music label, 16 8 and the combina-
tion of Time Warner's and Bertelsmann's music holdings would have given
the merged entity just over a third of the music publishing market in
Europe. 16 9 Though this represented only a minority share of the market,
the Commission believed that the online music market was sufficiently
fragmented so that even a minority position could establish market domi-
nance. 170 The possibility that AOL/Time Warner could condition access
to its music catalogue through its Winamp player, forcing competitors to
either license the player or the music catalogue, was simply too much for
the Commission, which required AOL to sever its ties with Bertelsmann
before the merger could win European approval. 17 1 Though a different
160. Id.; see Donald Baker, Antitrust Merger Review in an Era of Escalating Cross-Bor-
der Transactions and Effects, 18 Wis. INT'L LJ. 577, 582 (2000).
161. Turner, supra note 154, at 165.
162. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Opens Full Investigation
into AOL/Time Warner Merger (June 19, 2000), at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/
guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt>&doc=IP/00/634-0-AGED&lg=EN&display= (last visited
Oct. 13, 2003).
163. See Press Release, European Commission, Commission Gives Conditional
Approval to AOL/Time Warner Merger (Oct. 11, 2000), at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/
start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt>&doc=lP/00/634-0-AGED&lg=EN&display=
(last visited on Oct. 13, 2003).
164. Id.
165. Turner, supra note 154, at 166.
166. See id.
167. Press Release, European Commission Gives Conditional Approval to AOL/Time
Warner Merger, supra note 163.
168. Turner, supra note 154, at 167.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 167-68; see also Press Release, Commission Gives Conditional
Approval to AOL/Time Warner Merger, supra note 163.
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type of merger from Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, AOL/Time Warner also
illustrates that the Commission's primary concern is often with a merger's
impact on competitors rather than on competition. 17 2
III. The GE/Honeywell Merger
A. The Dance Begins: GE and Honeywell
General Electric (GE) is a diversified multinational corporation with
business units that include everything from light bulbs to television to
financial services. 173 GE's total revenues for 2001 exceeded $125 bil-
lion.' 74 The Financial Times has repeatedly named it the world's most
respected company. 175 GE is a leading producer of jet engines for large
commercial aircraft 176 and it also produces aircraft engines as part of a
50/50 joint venture with the French firm SNECMA under the name CFM
International. 177 In the jet engine market, GE's principal rivals are Pratt &
Whitney (a United Technology subsidiary) and Rolls Royce. 178
Honeywell, originally a heating and environmental controls provider,
gradually expanded through acquisitions into the aerospace industry. In
1999, Allied Signal (itself the product of a merger between Allied Corpora-
tion and Signal Companies) acquired Honeywell and adopted its name
after the merger. 179 Almost half of Honeywell's $23 billion of revenue in
2001 came from its aerospace division, which includes jet engines, avion-
ics, and non-avionics products. 180 Honeywell faces different rivals in each
172. See David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Competition Thinking at the European
Commission: Lessons from the Aborted GE/Honeywell Merger, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 489,
491-92 (2002); Stevens, supra note 4, at 275 (indicating that "[tihere were further suspi-
cions that EC opposition to the AOL/Time Warner merger stemmed from concerns
about the impact upon the large telephone companies of Europe that remain fragmented
and dominated by originally state-owned utility companies").
173. Barry J. Nalebuff, Bundling and the GE-Honeywell Merger 2 (Sept. 1, 2002)(Working paper No. 22, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=327380 (last vis-
ited Oct. 13, 2003)); see also Evans & Salinger, supra note 172, at 496-97.
174. Nalebuff, supra note 174, at 2.
175. Michael Skapinker, Different Game, but the Same Winners, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 20,
2003, at 2, available at 2003 WL 3434076.
176. Kolasky, supra note 19, at 9.
177. Nalebuff, supra note 174, at 2. The CFMI joint venture is especially important
because it accounts for a large percentage of GE's share of the market for large jet
engines. CFMI engines are the only models available on current production derivatives
of the Boeing 737, the most successful aircraft family in history. Including CFMI, GE
has an engine market share of around 65%. Id. If CFMI engines used on Boeing 737s
are excluded, though, GE's market share falls to 44% (even including all other CFMI
sales). The competitive analysis is obviously much different depending on which mar-
ket share is used: the Europeans included all CFMI sales, while the Americans excluded
those sales tied to the 737 program. Kolasky, supra note 19, at 10-11.
178. Kolasky, supra note 19, at 9.
179. Id. at 3.
180. Id.; see also Evans & Salinger, supra note 172, at 497 (noting that in 2000 aero-
space products accounted for forty percent of revenues). Avionics products consist of
aircraft guidance and control, navigation, and communication systems; non-avionics
products are things like landing gear, in-flight entertainment systems, and supplemental
power, electrical, and climate control systems. See id. at 499.
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business line: Pratt & Whitney is the principal competitor in its jet engine
business; Rockwell Collins and Thales are the main rivals in the avionics
market; and United Technology, BF Goodrich, and SNECMA are the princi-
pal rivals in the non-avionics market. 18 1
B. The American Response
After GE announced its plans to acquire Honeywell, the DOJ began an
investigation into the proposed merger. 18 2 The DOJ quickly identified two
markets with possible anticompetitive concerns for the merged company:
"the market for military helicopter engines, and the market for providing
heavy maintenance, repair, and overhaul ("MRO") services for aircraft
engines and auxiliary power units ("APUs")."' 8 3 With respect to helicopter
engines, GE and Honeywell largely dominated the market' 8 4 and the DOJ
determined that the merger risked substantially lessening competition,
possibly leading to higher prices, lower quality, and reduced innova-
tion. 185 Consequently, the DOJ required GE to sell Honeywell's helicopter
engine business as a condition of merger approval.18 6 In the MRO and
APU market, the DOJ was concerned with the potential for higher prices
and lower quality because of the combined company's dominant posi-
tion.18 7 To rectify this, the DOJ required GE to authorize a new third-party
MRO service provider for certain Honeywell aircraft engines and APUs in
order to inject competition into the market.'8 8 GE and Honeywell agreed
to both conditions.18 9 Other than these two concerns, the DOJ expressed
no further opposition to the proposed merger.
C. The European Response
GE and Honeywell did not enjoy as favorable a reception in Europe as
they did in the United States. In contrast to American regulators, the Com-
mission was unconcerned with the market for helicopters and MRO ser-
vices. 190 Instead, European authorities focused primarily on the markets
181. Kolasky, supra note 19, at 9.
182. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 364.
183. Id. at 364-65.
184. "GE and Honeywell are the two premier manufacturers of U.S. military helicop-
ter engines, collectively accounting for a substantial majority of all engines powering
U.S. military helicopters flying today. GE and Honeywell have also received virtually all
of the applicable research and development funding provided by the U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) through its Joint Turbine Advanced Gas Generator (JTAGG) program."
Press Release, DOJ,Justice Department Requires Divestitures in Merger Between General
Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
pressjreleases/2001/8140.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release].
185. Id.
186. Id. ("Honeywell's helicopter engine business accounted for revenues approximat-
ing $200 million in 2000.").
187. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 365.
188. Press Release, supra note 184.
189. Id.
190. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 367. "This is not surprising because this market had
very little effect on the Common Market and the issue had already been addressed and
remedied by the DOJ investigation." Id.
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for jet aircraft engines, avionics, non-avionics, and engine starters. 19 1 In
jet aircraft engines, a market untouched by U.S. regulators, the Commis-
sion determined that a combination of GE and Honeywell would result in a
monopoly position (100% market domination) in the market for large
regional aircraft jet engines 192 and a dominant position in the corporate jet
engine market, with the merged firm having a fifty to sixty percent market
share. 193 In the market for large commercial aircraft engines, the Commis-
sion found GE's sixty percent market share19 4 insufficient to establish mar-
ket dominance per se, but when coupled with the power and influence of
its GE Capital and GE Capital Aviation Services divisions, GE's high mar-
ket share acted as "proxy for dominance."' 95 As stated previously, a domi-
nant position is not automatic grounds for denying a merger (especially
when, as here, the dominant position already existed); rather, that position
must result in an appreciable anticompetitive impact on the common mar-
ket.19 6 The Commission ultimately also determined that the vertical inte-
191. See Kolasky, supra note 19, at 9; Schmitz, supra note 63, at 368; Dimitri Giotakos
et al., General Electric/Honeywell-An Insight into the Commission's Investigation and Deci-
sion, EC COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL., Oct. 2001, at 5-9. The Commission was also con-
cerned that the merged entity would have a dominant position in the market for small
marine gas turbine engines, but that is beyond the scope of this Note. See id. at 9.
192. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 368-69. The Commission actually broke the jet
engine market into three distinct segments depending on the market for the aircraft:
"[(a)] large commercial aircraft (i.e., aircraft with more than 100 seats, a range of greater
than 2,000 nautical miles and a cost in excess of USD 35 million), [(b)] regional jet
aircraft (i.e., aircraft with around 30 to 90 plus seats, a range of less than 2,000 nautical
miles and a cost of up to USD 30 million) and [(c)] corporate jet aircraft (i.e., aircraft
designed for corporate activities and with a cost generally in the region of USD 3 million
to USD 35 million)." Commission Decision of 03/07/2001 Declaring a Concentration
to Be Incompatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement (Case No. COMP/
M.2220 General Electric/Honeywell) (2001) [hereinafter GE/Honeywell], para. 10, avail-
able at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220 en.
pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2003). The Commission further broke the regional jet market
into small regional jets (30 to 50 passengers) and large regional jets (70 to 90 or more
passengers). Id. para. 20. Of these two submarkets, Honeywell and GE were the only
engine suppliers for large regional jets. Id. para. 22. Both GE and Honeywell felt these
categories were overly rigid and did not take into account the possible overlapping uses
of different types of jets at the margins as well as the presence, at the time, of only four
manufacturers of large regional jets. See Renzi, supra note 55, at 129; see also GE/Honey-
well, para. 21.
193. GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 435.
194. This number is subject to dispute. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
195. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 370-72; see also GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para.
163. GE Capital managed more than 80% of GE's assets (some $370 billion) and,
according to the Commission, could be used to absorb losses due to heavily discounted
aircraft engines, as well as influence the choice of engines by both airframe manufactur-
ers and airlines. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 370. GE Capital Aviations Services
(GECAS), GE's airplane leasing division, is the world's largest airplane buyer and the
Commission felt that GECAS could enhance GE's position in the market at the expense
of its rivals through attractive financing packages. Id. at 371; see also Renzi, supra note
55, at 131. Indeed, "[o]ver the past decade, of more than 600 planes purchased by
GECAS, only four did not have GE engines." Schmitz, supra note 63, at 371.
196. See Schmitz, supra note 63, at 378-79.
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gration 197 between GE and Honeywell in the production of large
commercial aircraft engines, 198 along with the potential for product bun-
dling, 199 could result in price increases and in GE's ability to artificially
manipulate entry into the market through its control of key compo-
nents. 200 The combination of GE's market share, the strength of its financ-
ing units, and the potential for vertical integration was enough to push the
merged entity into a position of market dominance. 201 This dominance,
along with the combined company's complete domination of the market
for large regional aircraft engines and dominant position in the market for
corporate jet engines, allowed the Commission to establish the necessary
impediment to competition in significant portions of the commercial jet
engine market sufficient to justify blocking the merger. 20 2
In addition to jet engines, the markets for avionics, non-avionics, and
engine controls, when coupled with GE's engine production capability and
financing strength, concerned the Commission. Honeywell had a market
share of between fifty to sixty percent in avionics, as high as an eighty to
ninety percent share of certain portions of the non-avionics market, and a
fifty to sixty percent share of the engine starter market. 203 As with the
197. The DOJ would be unlikely to characterize this as vertical integration but rather
simply the result of integration between the product lines of the two companies. See
Renzi, supra note 55, at 130.
198. GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 419-420. This is especially relevant in
terms of Honeywell's dominance of the engine starter market, in that GE could establish
an unbroken chain between itself as engine manufacturer and primary supplier of
starters.
199. Bundling involves combining a number of products and selling them as a pack-
age. See Giotakos, supra 191, at 10. In acquiring Honeywell, GE could offer a package,
or bundle, of products-such as engines, avionics, and continuing maintenance-to air-
frame manufacturers or airlines for a single price. See id. Bundling is fundamentally a
behavioral problem, in that it deals with how market actor uses its powers. See GE/
Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 530. "Merger control, on the other hand, is concerned
with the situation of the parties and the markets at the time of the merger, not with
possible future behavior." Schmitz, supra note 63, at 375. The bundling argument is
especially interesting because "[iut has been argued that the concept of bundling had no
valid foundation in European merger control." Id. at 377. At least one author has
argued, though, that the bundling element of the decision was not dispositive and that
the merger would have been stopped even if the Commission had not discussed bun-
dling at all. See id. at 378. Nevertheless, the Commission's concern with bundling
raises questions in future mergers. Merging parties must now be aware that "the Com-
mission, when assessing a proposed merger, will not only identify the relevant markets
in the traditional sense and assess the horizontal and vertical effects created by the
merger, but will also speculate how positions in markets that are not related might be
combined, even if there is no clear evidence that such behavior will emerge." Id. at 382.
For more on bundling, see infra Parts III.C and IV(A).
200. GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 427; see also infra note 207 and accompa-
nying text.
201. GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 412. EU authorities have referred to this
combination as "GE's [t]oolkit for [miarket [d]ominance." Drauz, supra note 111, at 898.
202. GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 458; see Stevens, supra note 4, at 274.
203. See Renzi, supra note 55, at 131 n.185. Honeywell's non-avionics market share
varied widely, from 80-90% share of the market for APUs to as low as no appreciable
market share for in flight entertainment systems. The Commission felt, though, that
Honeywell's wide range of non-avionics products put it in a unique position in the mar-
ket. See also GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 242, 275-276, 337.
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aircraft engine market, the Commission saw the potential for bundling to
be as troublesome as a dominant market position by the merged entity.
More specifically, the combined company, in the Commission's eyes,
would be able to offer a unique package, or bundle, of products at such
attractive price points that airframe manufacturers would choose the GE/
Honeywell offering regardless of whether the cost and quality of these
products matched those of competitors.20 4 The Commission also felt that
the combined company could engineer its individual products in such a
way that they only functioned effectively as part of a bundled system and
did not function alongside competitor's products.20 5 The Commission
feared that GE Capital and GECAS, because of their influence in the mar-
ket for airplanes, would exert pressure for "GE only" purchases, further
closing the market to competitors and enhancing Honeywell's already dom-
inant position. 20 6 The engine starter market was of special concern to the
Commission: 20 7
[Tihe merged entity would have an incentive to delay or disrupt the supply
of Honeywell engine starters to competing engine manufacturers, which
would result in damaging supply, distribution, profitability and competitive-
ness of GE's engine competitors. Likewise, the merged entity could increase
the prices of engine starters or their spares, thereby increasing rival engine
manufacturers' costs and reducing even further their ability to compete
against the merged entity.
20 8
Predictions similar to this appear throughout the Commission's for-
mal report on the merger.
In response to the Commission's findings, GE and Honeywell agreed
to make a variety of concessions, including offering to maintain GECAS as
a separate legal entity, 20 9 to divest part of the combined company's
204. GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 350-361, 372, 412; Schmitz, supra note 63,
at 379; Renzi, supra note 55, at 132.
205. See Schmitz, supra note 63, at 380. This is known as "pure bundling" or "tying,"
and the products are typically not offered on a standalone basis but only as part of the
larger bundle. An example of pure bundling would be changing the design of Honeywell
engine starters so that they only worked with GE engines. Contrast this with "mixed
bundling," where the products continue to be offered on a standalone basis, but are also
offered as part of package on discounted terms. See Matthias Pflanz & Cristina Caf-
farra, The Economics of G.E./Honeywell, 23 EUR. COMPEnTION L. REv. 115, 115 (2002).
206. See Schmitz, supra note 63, at 380; Renzi, supra note 55, at 131; see Kolasky,
supra note 19, at 15-20 (criticizing the Commission's decision).
207. See GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 331-340; see also Schmitz, supra note
63, at 380-81. It is arguable that Honeywell had a total domination of the market
because its only significant competitor, Hamilton Sundstrand, installed its engine start-
ers only in engines made by Pratt & Whitney, its sister company. Id. at 381.
208. GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 420; see also Schmitz, supra note 63, at
374. The idea, of course, would be to sell GE's engine starters to competitors at such a
price per unit that airframe manufacturers and airlines would be "driven" to GE's
engines through significantly lower total costs. Whether the combined company would
have actually damaged its dominant, and lucrative, position in aircraft starters-and
then not have experienced competitor inflow-for the sake of its engine division is, in
my opinion, debatable. See Kolasky, supra note 19, at 19.
209. GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 498.
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regional jet engine business, 210 to not engage in bundling, 21' and to sell
Honeywell's engine starter business. 212 Despite these concessions, the
Commission deemed the proposal submitted by GE and Honeywell unac-
ceptable213 and formally blocked the merger on July 3, 2001.214 Each
company separately appealed the decision of the Commission, 215 but the
merger is officially dead. 216
D. Winners and Losers
Scholars disagree on the correctness of the Commission's decision.
Some argue that even with the controversial stance on bundling the deci-
sion was in line with- European precedent.217 More specifically, the Com-
mission could only establish partial dominance in aircraft engines-the
market with the most significant Community dimension-and thus it
turned to other factors, including GE's financial strength, to make a more
conclusive determination of a dominant position.21 8 Once the Commis-
sion established that a dominant position would result, the merger was
rejected. Thus, the scholars argue that the decision "is essentially in line
with the tradition of European merger control." 21 9
Other scholars disagree with the Commission and point to two areas
of primary concern. First, opponents claim that the Commission's
approach lacked a sound economic basis, especially in the key area of effi-
210. Id. para. 495.
211. Id. para. 499.
212. Id. para. 493.
213. The Commission's rationale centered on the general inadequacy of the avionics,
non-avionics, and engine starters divestitures. See id. para. 500-17. The Commission
also thought that divestiture of Honeywell's large regional jet engine business was
impractical if not impossible, a point that is likely more valid than GE or Honeywell
would admit. See id. para. 519-22. The commitment not to engage in bundling was
considered "purely behavioural [sic] and as such [could not] constitute the basis for a
clear elimination of the said concerns." Id. para. 530. Finally, the Commission felt that
even if GECAS were to be a separate legal entity, control would remain in GE's hands.
Id. para. 531.
214. GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 567.
215. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 382.
216. Press Release, General Electric Co., GE and Honeywell Terminate Merger Agree-
ment (Oct. 2, 2001), available at http://www.ge.com/en/company/news/ar (last visited
Oct. 14, 2003).
217. See Stefan Schmitz, The European Commission's Decision in GE/Honeywell and the
Question of the Goals of Antitrust Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 539, 585-86 (2002). It
can be said that although bundling does not have valid foundation in European merger
control analysis, it has some support under the EMCR. Schmitz, supra note 217, at 581.
In Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, the Commission was concerned that the merged
entity's broader product range would give it the flexibility to structure prices, promo-
tions, and discounts through bundling. The merger was approved only after substantial
divestitures. See Commission Decision of Oct. 15, 1997 Declaring a Concentration to Be
Compatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case
IV/M.938-Guinness/Grand Metropolitan) 1998 OJ. (L 288) 24, available at http://
europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/1288/l28819981027enOO240054.pdf (last
visited Feb. 15, 2003); see also infra note 262 and accompanying text.
218. Schmitz, supra note 217, at 585-86.
219. Id. at 585.
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ciencies. 220 U.S. regulators supported the merger :because their analysis
showed that the combination would create merger-specific efficiencies that
would ultimately result in lower prices, and mergers that generate lower
prices are fundamentally pro-competitive. 22 1 The Commission, on the
other hand, viewed the merger-specific efficiencies more as the result of
strategic behavior than cost savings and therefore regarded them as
anticompetitive. 2 22 Second, the Commission only identified the potential
for harm; that is, it was unable to show, in any market, that the combina-
tion would lead to dominance, as required by the EMCR. 22 3 It does appear
that the Commission's economic analysis suffered from some fundamental
flaws that are traceable, at least in part, to the pro-competitor stance of the
Commission. 2 24 Thus, it is probably best to say that the Commission's
decision may be correct as a matter of EU policy, but incorrect on other,
more empirical, grounds.
IV. What Now? And Where Do We Go from Here?
A. Lessons for the Future
One of the most interesting aspects of the Commission's decision to
block the merger was its reliance on the possibility that the combined com-
pany might be able to bundle products at such attractive prices that com-
petitors would be unable to remain in the market. 2 25 Such bundling, or
portfolio effects, analysis is most common in conglomerate mergers, where
the merging firms function primarily in different markets, although there
may be some product overlap. 22 6 The concern is that a corporation may
be able to enhance its position in the market by offering a wide range of
products that are often purchased together, effectively providing consum-
220. See Kolasky, supra note 19, at 21-22.
221. See Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 63, at 20-21.
222. See id. at 21.
223. Nalebuff, supra note 174, at 5.
224. Evans & Salinger, supra note 172, at 518-20. For example, the Commission's
decision directly addressed the question of whether the merger would result in an
increase in the price of either GE's aircraft engines or Honeywell's avionics and non-
avionics products, or both. The Commission argued the following:
Prior to the merger, any increase in the price of the stand-alone product would
shift demand to a competing product. After the merger, by raising its stand-
alone prices, the merged entity will lose fewer sales because GE and Honeywell
products are also available through the bundle. Responding to these price
increases, some customers will prefer to buy the said products as part of the
bundle, at a lower price, rather than buying [them] separately, at a higher price.
Evans & Salinger, supra note 172, at 518.
However, it is not true that, as a matter of general economics, the merger would have
given GE an incentive to raise prices on unbundled products, as the Commission
claimed. Evans & Salinger, supra note 172, at 518-19 (Evans & Salinger give an excel-
lent discussion on this point in the appendix to their article).
225. See Schmitz, supra note 217, at 527.
226. See Renzi, supra note 55, at 123.
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ers with a "one-stop shop. ' 22 7 In the GE/Honeywell decision, the Commis-
sion described bundling as "a simple business arrangement whereby a
number of products are combined in a package and sold for a single
price"2 28 and expressed the most concern over the combined company's
potential for "mixed bundling whereby complementary products are sold
together at a price which, owing to the discounts that apply across the
product range, is lower than the price charged when they are sold sepa-
rately." 2 29 Such bundling could lead to a greater market share for the com-
bined company: "the merged entity will be able to price its packaged deals
in such a way as to induce customers to buy GE engines and Honeywell...
products over those of competitors, thus increasing the combined share of
GE and Honeywell [in] both markets. '230 However, as economists point
out, it is possible that bundling can also result in Pareto optimality where a
manufacturer makes more from sales while the consumer actually pays a
lower price. 23 1 This is the fundamental insight of the Cournot model, on
which all bundling analysis is based.2 32 If one imagines a market in which
there is a monopoly seller of good 1 (say, aircraft engines) and a monopoly
seller of good 2 (say, avionics) and where the two goods are used together
by the customer, each monopolist, acting independently, will set an inef-
ficiently high price.2 33 When the two firms merge, they can coordinate
their pricing and sell the two products together, thus stimulating the
demand for both goods.23 4 This results in lower prices for consumers and
227. See Aurlien Condomines, The Prohibition of the GE-Honeywell Merger by the
European Commission (Nov. 2001), at http://www.jurismag.net/articles/artiGB-
GEHoneywell.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
228. GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 293.
229. Id. para. 351. The U.S. uses a different definition of mixed bundling and notes
that it occurs when some items in the bundle are priced lower than their competitive
price in order to promote greater sales of the entire bundle. See Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division Submission for OECD Roundtable on Portfolio Effects in Conglomer-
ate Mergers, Range Effects: The United States Perspective 21 (Oct. 12, 2001), at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/9550.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter Range Effects]. Known as the "Cournot effect," this strategy is legal in the U.S.
unless the pricing is predatory. See id. Most importantly, in mixed bundling, the items
remain available separate from the bundle, but the package is sold at a discount relative
to the individual items. Nalebuff, supra note 174, at 6. This differs from pure bundling
where one of the items is sold in a bundle and by itself while the other is only available
as part of the bundle. Id. at 5; see supra note 205 and accompanying text.
230. GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 353.
231. See ROBERT H. FRANK & BEN S. BERNANKE, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 168 (2d
ed. 2004); Nalebuff, supra note 174, at 7.
232. Nalebuff, supra note 174, at 6-7.
233. Id. at 6. The price set by a monopolist is by definition inefficiently high. See
Robert Schenk, What Is Wrong with Monopoly?, available at http://ingrimayne.saintjoe.
edu/econ/Monopoly/Monopoly.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2003); FRANK & BERNANKE,
supra note 233, at 231.
234. Nalebuff, supra note 174, at 6 ("The overall price of two complementary technol-
ogies will tend to be lower when the technologies are sold together than when they are
sold separately. The explanation for this is that, when sold separately, neither party
takes account of the positive effect that a further reduction in its own price would have
on the sales of the other party. Thus, each party sets prices at a higher level than is
jointly profit-maximi[z]ing. When sold together, this positive externality can be
internali[z]ed and the overall price will be reduced.").
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increased revenues for the merged firm. 235 The Commission acknowl-
edged that both GE and Honeywell already had the capability to bundle
their products and that these bundles would be desirable from the con-
sumer's standpoint but still rejected the merger as anticompetitive and thus
harmful to consumers.
23 6
1. Bundling and Conglomerate Mergers
The trouble with bundling, as a merger investigation tool, is twofold:
there is virtually no support in EU merger law for such an analysis, 237 and
there are real doubts about the anticompetitive impacts of portfolio-related
theories like bundling.238 On the lack of support for blocking a merger
based on product bundling, Stefan Schmitz put it this way:
Although it is probably true that the new company would indeed have the
potential to bundle and it cannot be ruled out that at one point in time it
might engage in this behavior, using this potential to conclude that the
merger would strengthen a pre-existing dominant position within the mean-
ing of ECMR Article 2 is questionable.
23 9
It is also interesting to note that, despite Honeywell's strong positions
in the markets for avionics, large regional jet engines, and corporate jet
engines, there was no evidence that Honeywell had previously engaged in
bundling or that Honeywell's competitors (including GE) had found it
235. See id. at 6-7. "Each firm causes a negative externality on the competition by
raising its price. When the two firms combine, they internalize this effect and lower
prices." Id. at 7.
236. Rockwell "Collins will be very much depend[e]nt on the willingness of airlines
not to behave in an economically rational way (by purchasing the merged entity's bun-
dled product offers) and to keep selecting Collins' equipment." GE/Honeywell, supra
note 192, para. 312. Rockwell Collins, it should be remembered, is a major Honeywell
competitor.
237. Indeed, in a previous case (involving the merger of the two companies that even-
tually formed Honeywell) the Commission stated that on the facts of that case the ability
to bundle would not impede competition. See Commission Decision of Dec. 1, 1999 C
(1999) 4057 Final Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the Common Market and
the Functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.1601, AlliedSignal/Honeywell)
(1999) para. 110-114, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/
cases/decisions/m1601en.pdf; see also Drauz, supra note 111, at 886 (noting that
"there is no explicitly stated framework for the analysis of conglomerate mergers ...
under the [EMCR]").
238. It is interesting to note that there was a time when American courts, along with
the DOJ and FTC, embraced the entrenchment theory of competitive harm from con-
glomerate mergers, which is remarkably similar to the concerns expressed by the Com-
mission over bundling. See Range Effects, supra note 229, at 2. Embodied in FTC v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967), this allowed for the blocking of mergers "if
they strengthened an already dominant firm through greater efficiencies or gave the
acquired firm access to a broader line of products or greater financial resources" suffi-
cient to harm smaller rivals. Range Effects, supra note 229, at 2. Such an approach was
categorically rejected by both agencies in 1982 because it would be illogical "to prohibit
mergers because they facilitate efficiency or innovation in production." Id. (emphasis in
original). Today, this so-called "efficiencies defense," while not absolute, weighs
strongly against finding a conglomerate merger as anticompetitive. See Renzi, supra note
55, at 124; see also Range Effects, supra note 229, at 11.
239. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 375.
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impossible to compete with Honeywell's wide range of products. 240 For
example, "the EU never explained why SNECMA, one of Honeywell's two
principal competitors in the market for landing gear, would cooperate with
GE in letting Honeywell domina[te] that market."'24 1 Indeed, the Commis-
sion determined that bundling was not a significant competitive phenome-
non in the industry just eighteen months earlier. 24 2
With regard to economic theory, bundling analysis builds on the idea
that when competitors combine they eliminate the negative externality
associated with competition.2 43 This does not require, however, that goods
be perfect complements, nor does it factor in the specific form of the
demand or cost functions.24 4 That is, the basic bundling model does not
consider a merger's impact on other firms in the market; the incentive to
cut prices to expand the market or compete against rivals (or both) is not
present in the model.2 45 Here, GE/Honeywell cannot significantly expand
the market for aircraft engines because this is almost entirely a factor of the
total demand for aircraft.2 46 As such, the reason behind a price cut is
almost certainly a desire to take market share from rivals. 2 47 Competitors,
however, are unlikely to sit idle as GE makes a play for more of the market:
they will respond with their own price cuts, offsetting the merging firms'
potential gain. 248 Thus, regulators must focus on this new equilibrium
point for a true understanding of the post-merger market. 249 The EU,
rather than trying to locate this point, simply declared that the mixed bun-
dling price cuts were not real efficiencies but rather the result of "strategic
pricing" that would not ultimately result in sustainable price reduc-
tions.2 50 This analysis is nearly impossible to justify, since there is no
sound economic reason for distinguishing between productive and alloca-
240. Pflanz & Caffarra, supra note 205, at 116.
241. Kolasky, supra note 19, 11 n.29.
242. Id. at 11 n.6; Commission Decision of December 1, 1999 C (1999) 4057 Final
Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the Common Market and the Functioning
of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M. 1601, AlliedSignal/Honeywell) (1999) para. 121,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1601 
.
en.pdf; see also Nalebuff, supra note 174, at 27; supra note 237 and accompanying text.
243. Nalebuff, supra note 174, at 7. When a firm raises its price, it generates a nega-
tive externality on the competition. Id. The combination of two competitors internalizes
this cost and lowers prices. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See id. Put another way, the price of an engine is only a small part of the total
price of a new aircraft. See GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 374. A price cut by
GE-or any engine manufacturer-is incredibly unlikely to so change the cost metric
that it, independent of a price cut by an airframe maker, could spur demand for new
aircraft and enlarge the market. An analogy: a price cut in tires is unlikely to cause
greater demand for cars. See Nalebuff, supra note 174, at 7. The Commission disagrees
with this analysis. GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 375-76.
247. See Nalebuff, supra note 174, at 7.
248. See id. at 7-8. This squares with existing evidence that other leasing companies
are actively trying to differentiate themselves from GECAS by purchasing non-GE
engines. Ruffner, supra note 84, at 1316.
249. Nalebuff, supra note 174, at 7-8.
250. See Drauz, supra note 111, at 907; Kolasky, supra note 19, at 20.
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tive efficiencies. 25 1 As long as consumers benefit from lower prices and
increased output, there is no reason to believe that this is somehow less
beneficial or sustainable because it comes from the internalization of nega-
tive externalities rather than strictly through cost savings. 25 2 Externalities,
after all, are a type of cost. In addition, the specific nature of the market in
question tends to weigh against bundling theory, in that the anticompeti-
tive effects from bundling presuppose that all buyers are charged the same
price, which is decidedly not the case in the ultracompetitive aviation mar-
ket characterized by highly differentiated products, powerful and sophisti-
cated buyers, and individually negotiated transactions. 2 53
Given all of these theoretical questions on bundling in the aerospace
market, it is useful to see whether the empirical evidence tracks the theory.
Initially, it does seem that bundling is important: companies like Honey-
well often make a bid to supply components from across their product
lines.25 4 However, the bids are broken down into prices for each individ-
ual component, which then total the price of the bundle.25 5 Bundling,
though, involves a discount; if there is no discount, there is no bundling.
2 56
The Commission attempted to document several cases of bundling by Hon-
eywell, 25 7 but the bundles failed to induce the customer to buy the pack-
age. 25 8 These cases also do not distinguish between a discount offered by
the supplier (with the customer getting the discount even if only parts,
instead of the entire bundle, are purchased) and a discount conditioned on
buying the bundle (with the customer not getting the discount without
purchasing the entire bundle). 25 9 If bundling really is effective, one
"should see contracts that are won, not lost. And these contracts should
offer a substantial discount for buying the entire package over A la carte
purchases. ' '260 The evidence shows, categorically, that neither of these
things are happening; the model used by the Commission simply does not
fit the nature of the market. 2 61 Perhaps that is why the Commission seem-
ingly abandoned bundling at the last minute.2
62
251. Kolasky, supra note 19, at 20.
252. Id. This is true so long as the prices do not violate antitrust laws or cause harm
to consumer welfare from predatory (below cost) pricing. Id. at 21 (citing Atlantic Rich-
field Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990)).
253. See Nalebuff, supra note 174, at 8. The Cournot model is based on the assump-
tion that firms do not price discriminate in the market; that is, that they set a single
price for all customers. Id. As soon as price discrimination enters the equation, much,
if not all, of the bundling advantage disappears. Id. Nalebuff goes on to state that
"[w]hen the customer type is known and prices are negotiated, bundling can never lead
to higher profits." Id. at 16. Both of these factors are characteristic of the market for
aircraft. Id.
254. Id. at 23.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 364-365.
258. Nalebuff, supra note 174, at 24.
259. Id. at 24.
260. Id. at 25.
261. See id. at 32; Kolasky, supra note 19, at 12.
262. The Commission explained as follows:
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2. Bundling, the Commission, and the Future
Despite this shaky economic evidence, the Commission seems intent
on stamping out mergers that have even a hint of bundling.2 63 There is no
question that a firm with a dominant position in many markets may be
able to wield an inappropriately large amount of power over prices and
product development.2 64 Yet, conglomerate mergers do result in real and
quantifiable efficiencies. 2 65 It may be that, if the Commission intends to
use bundling analysis in future mergers, it needs to step back from a for-
malistic focus on bundling and transition to a more functional, market-
focused approach. 26 6 The concerns expressed by Charles James, former
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, about bundling analysis, as cur-
rently applied, echo many in the legal, academic, and business
communities:
[It] will lead antitrust regulators to disapprove efficiency-enhancing mergers
on the basis of highly speculative and unprovable theories of competitive
harm. Without a high standard of proof, . . . [bundling analysis] runs the
risk of becoming an ill-defined, catch-all theory that allows antitrust regula-
tors to challenge virtually any merger on the basis of vague fears of "domi-
nance" . . . [and] would represent a step backwards in the evolution of
antitrust policy, which has generally been moving toward[s] more clearly-
defined, economics-based enforcement criteria. 26 7
Because of the speculative nature of bundling problems, there is some
attraction to the idea of dealing with them ex post: as long as sufficient
mechanisms exist to block anticompetitive behavior by a merged entity (as
they do in both the United States and the EU), higher prices as a result of
bundling can be addressed when they arise. 2 68 Antitrust law, after all,
"The various economic analyses have been subject to theoretical controversy, in
particular as far as the economic model of . . . bundling[ ] . .. is concerned.
However, the Commission does not consider the reliance on one or the other
model necessary for the conclusion that the packaged deals that the merged
entity will be in a position to offer will foreclose competitors from the engines
and avionics/non-avionics markets."
GE/Honeywell, supra note 192, para. 352. In truth, the Commission never stated any-
thing beyond mere speculation and was never able to offer evidence to justify its predic-
tions on the economic impact of any product bundling. See Ruffner, supra note 84, at
1312-13.
263. GE/Honeywell is the third major case in five years to contain at least some "port-
folio power" analysis. See Case IV/M.938, Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, 1998 OJ. (L
288); Case No. IV/M.877, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, 1997 OJ. (L 336).
264. See Renzi, supra note 55, at 125.
265. See Kolasky, supra note 19, at 1-2. Kolasky also states that the DOJ "simply
could not identify any conditions under which a conglomerate merger, unlike a horizon-
tal or vertical merger, would likely give the merged firm the ability and incentive to raise
price and restrict output." Id. at 1.
266. See generally Nalebuff, supra note 174, at 25 (discussing the impracticality of
bundling in the market for jet engines).
267. Range Effects, supra note 229, at 4.
268. See Kolasky, supra note 19, at 24-25; see also Schmitz, supra note 217, at 622.
The Europeans tend to disfavor this approach because, in the absence of the treble dam-
ages permitted under U.S. law, ex post remedies are seen as less effective in the EU.
Kolasky, supra note 19, at 24-25.
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does not vanish once a merger is complete.
B. Pulling Back and Moving Forward
In recent months, European regulators have attempted to clarify their
stance on the role that bundling played in the decision to block the merger,
calling it "an additional aggravating or mitigating factor to existing horizon-
tal and/or vertical effects," 26 9 and stating "that the GE/Honeywell merger,
in its effects, as analyzed by the Commission, is not a 'portfolio effects'
case." 2 70 It is relatively clear that this is merely an attempt to shift the
analysis 2 71 back to the more traditional examination of the horizontal and
vertical effects of a proposed merger rather than allowing the decision to
stand as a glimpse at a future where "speculative long-term harms" drive
the analysis. 2 72 Despite this change by the Europeans, bundling remains
highly illustrative of the fundamental differences in merger policy between
the United States and the EU. In one sense, it could be said that American
regulators view bundling as a positive merger externality because it
enhances efficiency. 2 73 Such efficiency arguments hold little weight with
European regulators because of their concern with single-firm market dom-
ination and the impact it has on competitors. 2 74 Even if a single firm can
be more efficient and consequently pass on those efficiencies to consum-
ers, it is unlikely to be sufficient to support the merger if the Commission
feels the merged firm can ultimately harm competitors. 275
[T]he imposition of fines on the dominant merged firm, no matter how heavy
they may be, cannot do much, if anything, to reinstate the competitive thrust
and constraint of weakened or exiting rivals. The damage to competition will
have already occurred and the legal system for prevention of the creation of mar-
ket power, notably through an effective merger control policy, will have failed.
Drauz, supra note 111, at 908.
269. Dimitri Giotakos, GE/Honeywell: A Theoretical Bundle Assessing Conglomerate
Mergers Across the Atlantic, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 469, 473 (2002).
270. Drauz, supra note 111, at 897.
271. Or, perhaps more appropriately, it is an attempt to tie the European analysis of
the merger back with traditional analysis.
272. William J. Kolasky, GE/Honeywell: Continuing the Transatlantic Dialog, 23 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 513, 519-20 (2002) [hereinafter Kolasky, Transatlantic Dialog].
273. Kolasky, supra note 19, at 20; see Kolasky, Transatlantic Dialog, supra note 272, at
518. Put another way, to the extent product bundling leads to lower prices (through
buyer-side efficiencies as a result of the bundles or economies of scope, for example),
they are consistent with the American philosophy. See generally Edward T. Swaine,
"Competition, Not Competitors," Nor Canards: Ways of Criticizing the Commission, 23 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 597, 620 (2002). It is entirely possible-indeed, probable-that
American regulators would never dig so far into the merger as to decide on the price
points for various hypothetical product bundles. See generally Kolasky, supra note 19, at
25 (stating that "we are simply more humble about our ability to predict the future"). As
long as the merger preserved competition in the market, American regulators are com-
fortable with the idea that efficiencies flow from that competition. See Kolasky, Transat-
lantic Dialog, supra note 272, at 518-19.
274. See Kauper, supra note 30, at 320.
275. See id. at 321. Two comments illustrate this tension, one from Mario Monti,
European Commissioner for Competition Policy, and one from Deborah Majoras, Dep-
uty Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust. "Our view is that whilst conglomerate
mergers are normally not anti-competitive, under some circumstances they can lead to
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V. Moving Forward or Standing Still: Is a Solution Needed?
A. Moving Beyond the Status Quo
By now, it should be clear that U.S. and European regulators have fun-
damentally differing, and often directly conflicting, views on some aspects
of merger control. Thomas Boeder noted that the "primary difference"
between antitrust analysis in the United States and Europe is that "the
focus in the United States is on the process of competition and consumer
impact; the focus in Europe is on the interests of both competitors and
consumers." 27 6 Put another way, American regulators tend to be more con-
cerned with a merger's impact on the market as a whole, whereas European
regulators are much more interested in a merger's concentration of power
in the hands of a single firm. 2 77 It is almost inevitable that these two con-
flicting approaches will lead to different outcomes, even on the same set of
facts. 2 78
And yet, is that necessarily true? After all, only since the EMCR
became effective in 1990 has the European Union developed a strong,
cohesive antitrust policy. 2 79 Before that, merger control was largely in the
hands of member states.280 Since the EMCR, European regulators have
blocked only one merger-GE/Honeywell-that received approval from
U.S. competition authorities. 28 1 While U.S. and EU regulators sometimes
disagreed on the potential impacts of a merger, such as the different con-
cerns expressed in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and AOL/Time Warner
mergers, this has not resulted in strained relations between U.S. and EU
regulators or a conviction by either side that they were using fundamen-
tally incompatible types of analyses. Some commentators suggest that GE/
Honeywell was a blip on the global antitrust radar: a rare but inevitable
disagreement by regulatory bodies that generally arrive at the same conclu-
sion despite the use of different means.28 2 Charles James originally
remarked that the EU's decision reflected "a simple, but rather fundamen-
tal, doctrinal disagreement over the economic purposes and scope of anti-
exclusionary effects and a worsening of competition conditions." Mario Monti, Anti-
trust in the U.S. and Europe: A History of Convergence, Speech at the General Counsel
Roundtable -American Bar Association (Nov. 14, 2001), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
competition/speeches/indexspeechesby the commissioner.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2003). "[A]ntitrust should rarely, if ever, interfere with any conglomerate merger."
Deborah Platt Majoras, GE-Honeywell: The U.S. Decision, Remarks Before the Antitrust
Law Section, State Bar of Georgia 13-14 (Nov. 29, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/speeches/9893.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
276. Boeder, supra note 133, at 142-43.
277. See Kauper, supra note 30, at 320-21.
278. See generally Schmitz, supra note 217, at 383.
279. Kauper, supra note 30, at 311.
280. Id.
281. Schmitz, supra note 217, at 325-26; Evans & Salinger, supra note 172, at 490.
282. See, e.g., Editorial Comment, GE and Brussels, FIN. TIMES (London), June 18,
2001, at 19, available at 2001 WL 25827282; Mario Monti, supra note 275 (stating that
"the EU and US agencies have, in spite of the different legal instruments at [their] dispo-
sal, been using the same micro-economic analytical tools, and increasingly so in recent
years.").
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trust enforcement. What led the U.S. to clear the transaction-the prospect
that it would make the combined firm a more effective competitor-was the
very reason the E.U. opposed it."'28 3 By the spring of 2002, James's tone
had softened, and he noted that "the Commission now has made it clear,
even to us, that it shares our view that the ultimate goal of antitrust policy
must be consumer welfare, and that it views merger-generated efficiencies
positively and will not challenge a merger just because it creates a more
efficient firm."28 4 This attitude echoes pledges from competition officials
on both sides of the Atlantic to redouble their efforts to harmonize compe-
tition laws in the belief that closer cooperation will thwart differing out-
comes in the future. 285 Despite these sentiments, some business leaders
and antitrust officials are concerned that GE/Honeywell is a stark illustra-
tion of the significant differences that remain between the United States
and the EU regarding abuse of dominance and monopolization and that
these differences will only result in more blocked mergers as the EU
becomes evermore committed to enforcing its competition policy. 28 6 If
this is true, then GE/Honeywell is not a one-time aberration, but a harbin-
ger of problems to come.
28 7
B. A Problem in Need of a Solution?
Not surprisingly, the GE/Honeywell decision prompted a flurry of
articles and commentary on what the Unites States and the EU should do
in order to harmonize antitrust policy. Many commentators have written
about a global antitrust body that would standardize enforcement across
borders and prompt a harmonization of antitrust law akin to the progress
made in standardizing international finance law. 28 8 Proposals for a global
antitrust body generally take two forms. The first proposes an antitrust
authority housed under the auspices of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) or Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
283. Charles A. James, Reconciling Divergent Enforcement Policies: Where Do We Go
from Here?, Address at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 28th Annual Conference
on International Law and Policy 4-5 (Oct. 25, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/pub-
lic/speeches/9395.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
284. James, supra note 58, at 6.
285. See Eleanor M. Fox, Mergers in Global Markets: GE/Honeywell and the Future of
Merger Control, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 457, 464 (2002).
286. See Kolasky, Transatlantic Dialog, supra note 272, at 515. Kolasky attributes the
differences to a greater faith in markets than in regulators in the U.S. and a greater
confidence in the benefits of governmental intervention in the market in the EU.
Kolasky, supra note 19, at 27. "Europeans may also simply be uncomfortable with [the
U.S.] emphasis on efficiency and ... unwillingness to cut competitors any slack." Id.
287. Kolasky, Transatlantic Dialog, supra note 272, at 514-15; see Hochstadt, supra
note 120, at 379-80.
288. See William P. Connolly, Note, Lessons to Be Learned: The Conflict in Interna-
tional Antitrust Law Contrasted with Progress in International Financial Law, 6 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 207, 220 (2001) (discussing developments like the International Organi-
zation of Securities Commissions and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision as
robust international responses to challenges facing the international financial
community).
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(OECD), and is advanced principally by the Europeans. 289 Many commen-
tators are critical of shoehorning antitrust into either the WTO or OECD,
principally because neither organization is structurally capable of handling
the unique body of antitrust law.290 A second proposal, akin to ideas
advanced by Joel Klein 29 1 and Charles James, 29 2 calls for the creation of a
new global body to promulgate international antitrust standards. 293
James's plan, known as the Global Competition Network,2 94 would focus
"exclusively on the procedural and substantive issues directly affecting
multijurisdictional antitrust enforcement" 295 and provide a forum for
structured dialogue in the hope of developing uniform practices that would
then be adopted by individual countries. 29 6 This proposal has promise,
but it is also nonbinding.
Regional agreements to harmonize competition policy, while initially
very promising, still have a long way to go before they can be considered a
success.2 9 7 Surprisingly, the United States and the European Union have
an agreement that covers a wide range of competition subjects. 29 8 Signed
in 1991, one of the agreement's primary aims was to overcome conflicts
between competition authorities. 29 9 Unfortunately, the agreement focuses
289. Sugden, supra note 13, at 1001.
290. Id. Critics are quick to point out that the WTO, which was created to foster
global trade policy, is almost fundamentally incompatible with fostering global competi-
tion policy because trade policy focuses on the interests of an individual competitor (i.e.,
government efforts to encourage exports by domestic industries), while competition pol-
icy focuses on the interests of competitive markets (i.e., industry practices that raise
prices through reduced output). Id. at 1002. The WTO is also concerned with policing
the activities of governments through trade-damaging behavior like high tariffs, and its
quasi-diplomatic proceedings are built around the political realities of international rela-
tions. Id. at 1002-03. Competition laws, on the other hand, are designed to remedy
conduct by private parties (usually corporations) and the norms of international politics
simply do not apply. Id. The OECD, which is designed to foster cooperation and dis-
cussion on economic policy matters, appears, at first instance, a slightly better candi-
date to host a global antitrust body until one realizes that the OECD has no power to
enforce the recommendations of its members. Id. at 1003-04.
291. Joel Klein & Robert Pitofsky, Press Conference at the International Bar Associa-
tion 10th Anniversary Merger Control Conference (Sept. 14, 2000), at http://
www.useu.be/issues/klein09l8.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
292. See James, supra note 14.
293. Id. at 9.
294. The body is now known as the International Competition Network. James, supra
note 58, at 26.
295. James, supra note 14, at 9.
296 Id. at 10. According to Mario Monti, this "venue should provide a forum where
government officials [... I and others can 'exchange ideas and work toward common
solutions of competition law and policy problems." Mario Monti, Speech at UNCTAD
3rd IGE Session, International Co-Operation and Technical Assistance: A View from the
EU (July 4, 2001), at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=
gt&doc=SPEECH/01/328--RAPD&lg=EN (last visited Oct.15, 2003).
297. See Sugden, supra note 13, at 1004-05.
298. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competi-
tion Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-Eur. Comm., 30 I.L.M. 1491.
299. Sugden, supra note 13, at 1005.
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more on greater cooperation than on law harmonization. 30 0 For example,
it is silent on how a jurisdiction should engage, if at all, in bundling analy-
sis.30 1 Without question, the agreement has led to an unusually high level
of cooperation between American and European competition officials, 30 2
but this cooperation tends to be more procedural than substantive. For
example, even though regulators on both sides of the Atlantic often con-
duct joint interviews with company officials,30 3 they still retire to separate
jurisdictions with conflicting standards to promulgate a decision. 30 4 Such
incremental steps are, in the end, helpful only at the margins.
VI. A Possible Solution
At this point, it is reasonable to ask if anything really needs to be done
about the divergence between the United States and European Union. My
answer is a qualified yes, because I do not believe that GE/Honeywell is a
"first and only" situation. Commentator Sarah Stevens puts it this way:
[A] lack of consensus as to the ultimate aims and goals of antitrust law
means that there is a significant likelihood that a merger will be reviewed
and perceived differently by different antitrust authorities ....
There remains no overall consensus that merger control should focus on the
criteria of efficiency. American antitrust law tends to elevate the welfare of
the consumer as the ultimate goal, which is probably the closest example to,
but still not wholly consonant with, an efficiency-based analysis in its purest
form. The EC, however, expressly acknowledges competition law as a mech-
anism for the pursuit of non-efficiency related goals .... European competi-
tion law has long been recognized as a tool for achieving integration of the
economically disparate as well as socially and culturally diverse Member
States of the EU.3
0 5
These different substantive standards, in addition to the lack of desire
on either side of the Atlantic to cede competition policy to a global body,
can make global antitrust seem like an intractable problem.
Yet, it is beyond dispute that the companies involved will benefit from
a greater level of certainty about their chances for merger success. 30 6 The
chilling effect of a wide divergence in competition policy, or even a few
more blocked mergers, is obvious. 30 7 History makes it clear that a global
300. See id. at 1006.
301. See id. at 1005-06.
302. Id. at 1006.
303. See Kolasky, supra note 19, at 8; see also Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 63, at
22.
304. See Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 63, at 23.
305. Stevens, supra note 4, at 284-85.
306. See Kolasky, supra note 19, at 22 ("[Tlhere are serious externalities associated
with one jurisdiction blocking a merger on the basis of theories that other jurisdictions
believe risk sacrificing important efficiencies to prevent speculative future harm to
competition.").
307. See id. at 23 ("[D]ivergent substantive standards between the U.S. and Europe are
almost certain to increase the transactions [sic] costs associated with the merger clear-
ance process. The result may well be to deter mergers that would have been pro-competi-
tive and efficiency-enhancing."); see also Peter Spiegel, US Calls for More Antitrust
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competition policy is unlikely to develop organically and that regional
agreements, the most successful convergence mechanisms to date, are not
always sufficient.308 Law harmonization could take decades, if it ever
occurs.30 9 As such, global business needs access to a safety valve that will
ensure that the policies of one jurisdiction will not arbitrarily foreclose a
valid merger opportunity. The international efforts to find a solution are
one testament to regulators true feelings on the need for a harmonization
of policies across borders. Just where, or how, this will come about
remains unclear.
A. Antitrust Arbitration in the United States and the European Union
Developments in U.S. antitrust enforcement may provide one glimpse
of an intermediate step for competition policy pending further law harmo-
nization. Private enforcement of the antitrust laws has long been seen as
playing an important role in preserving competition. 3 10 Yet, antitrust
actions are incredibly fact-intensive and unusually susceptible to the delay
and expense of traditional litigation.3 1 1 Arbitration provides a stream-
lined, cost-effective, and binding procedure to resolve antitrust disputes,3 12
and many businesses have turned to arbitration clauses as a way to ensure
more expedient resolution of commercial disagreements. 3 13 Though the
federal government has explicitly endorsed arbitration since 1925, 3 14 it
was initially unclear whether arbitration extended to the antitrust laws
because of the profound public interest involved and questions about
whether private arbitrators, rather than federal courts, could properly
effectuate antitrust policy. 3 1 5 American courts initially concluded that the
public policy tension between the goals of arbitration and broader goals of
antitrust was too strong to allow antitrust disputes to be arbitrated. 31 6 In
Agreement with Europe, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 26, 2001, at 11 ("The potential eco-
nomic consequences of antitrust law meaning one thing in one jurisdiction and some-
thing extremely different in another are enormous.").
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(1986); see also 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000) (noting that "any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue").
311. See Fuglsang, supra note 21, at 795.
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313. See James J. Calder et al., A New Alternative to Antitrust Litigation: Arbitration of
Antitrust Disputes, ANTITRUST, Spring 1989, at 18-19 (noting that "traditional antitrust
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314. See Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (providing that written
provisions for arbitration in a contract involving interstate commerce is "valid, irrevoca-
ble, and enforceable").
315. See Allison, supra note 310, at 232. "Because of the paramount importance of
antitrust law to national economic policy, even private antitrust disputes are not purely
private but are semipublic in character." Id.
316. See Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
The primary tension for the court was the "federal statutory protection of a large seg-
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1985, the Supreme Court largely (though not explicitly) reversed this doc-
trine, holding that antitrust disputes stemming from international commer-
cial transactions could be arbitrated pursuant to a contractual arbitration
clause3 1 7 and emphasizing "the need of the international commercial sys-
tem for predictability in the resolution of disputes. 31 8 Later cases have
implicitly extended the arbitrability of antitrust claims to the domestic con-
text as well.3
1 9
In the European Union, arbitration is a recognized form of dispute
resolution, but the proper scope of arbitration within the EU's competition
policy framework is unclear. 3 20 The Commission has the exclusive power
under Article 85 to grant exemptions to European competition law and has
used this power in the past to require the parties to disclose any arbitration
awards for exempted arrangements. 3 2 1 In doing so, the Commission has
tacitly acknowledged that there is a place for arbitration in European com-
petition law.3 22 The Commission has been hostile to arbitration clauses
that threaten to result in trade-restraining practices, 3 23 but this should not
be confused with a belief that antitrust claims are nonarbitrable because
the Commission has upheld arbitration clauses. 3 24 The European Court of
Justice has also indirectly recognized the arbitrability of disputes under
European competition law. 32 5 However, the absence of a private cause of
action under EU competition law 3 26 significantly affects the overall useful-
ness of arbitration provisions and has undoubtedly resulted in a slower
doctrinal development than in the United States.
B. Arbitration as an Intermediate Step in Law Harmonization
By one estimate, ninety percent of all international contracts contain
ment of the public, frequently in an inferior bargaining position, and encouragement of
arbitration." Id. at 826.
317. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 639-40
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much of the reasoning of Mitsubishi was applicable to domestic antitrust disputes);
Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding an
antitrust claim arbitrable if within the scope of the arbitration clause); Nghiem v. NEC
Electronic, Inc., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994) (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate a
domestic antitrust dispute); Fuglsang, supra note 21 at 804 n.223 (collecting cases).
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arbitration clauses. 3 2 7 Several international treaties, of which the New
York Convention 328 is the most prominent, create a framework for the
enforcement of international arbitration awards. The International Cham-
ber of Commerce, the most prominent arbitration institution, and various
other entities provide arbitration services throughout the world.3 29 Given
that arbitration is firmly established in international commerce, an inter-
mediate step toward a truly global antitrust policy may be a type of binding
arbitration for mergers, like GE/Honeywell, that are approved by one set of
regulators but blocked by another.3 30 Under this system, once a conflict-
ing competition decision is reached, all sides-the government agencies
and the merging companies-would submit their findings for review, much
like they would if a private contract with an arbitration clause were at
issue. The arbitrator 3 3 ' would promulgate a final response by adopting the
position of one side.33 2 In a sense, this process would be similar to the
WTO's dispute settlement process for countries accused of trade viola-
tions, which should serve as a model. 33 3 Competition authorities on both
sides of the Atlantic would have a significant incentive to develop as strong
327. See KLAUS PETER BERGER, 9 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 8 n.62 (Norbert
Horn & Richard M. Buxbaum eds.,1993).
328. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
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tional Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 100 (2000).
330. The U.S. Department of Justice has developed a handbook on the use of binding
arbitration by federal agencies. See PHYLLIS HANFLING & MARTHA McCLELLAN, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, DEVELOPING GUIDANCE FOR BINDING ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL
AGENCIES, at http://www.usdoj.gov/adr/arbitra.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
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member of each delegation would be the head of the relevant competition agency. Mem-
bers of the WTO's Appellate Body, which must be "comprise[d] [of] persons of recog-
nized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject
matter of the covered agreements generally [and who] shall be unaffiliated with any
government" seem like especially promising candidates for the panel. Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Mak-
karesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art. 17(3), at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/28-dsu.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003)
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333. See generally Dispute Settlement, supra note 331.
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a case as possible, knowing that the arbitration might ultimately act as a
substantive review of their decision.33 4 The arbitrator would not be a per-
manent entity but would meet only when conflicting merger decisions
were reached and then disband. 335 This avoids the necessity of finding a
global body in which to house the arbitrator and prevents the arbitrator
from having any impact on mergers other than when needed. 33 6 That said,
the International Competition Network (ICN) seems like the ideal body to
take the lead role, if only because it already represents the collective wis-
dom of competition regulators throughout the world. Arbitrators could be
drawn from active but neutral ICN members, and service would simply be
another element of ICN membership.
3 3 7
Using GE/Honeywell as an example, the two sides would turn to arbi-
tration only after the Unites States and the EU reached their conflicting
decisions. At that point, each side, including the relevant corporations,
would have a chance to present their case. Costs would be split three
ways3 3 8-between the United States, the EU, and merging companies-and
the arbitrator would be required to issue a final decision within two
334. This would go a long way to answering American concerns that the Commission
sometimes acts "as investigator, prosecutor, judge, and jury" because judicial review of
decisions to block mergers in the EU is "slow and highly deferential to the Commis-
sion[ I." Kolasky, supra note 19, at 26. This might be changing as three Commission
decisions to block mergers have recently been overturned by European courts. Lou
Whiteman, Could GE-Honeywell Rise from the Dead?, THEDEAL.COM, (Nov. 28, 2002), at
http://204.118.37.25/siteware/output/buildings/2002/11/28/eng-dailydeal-tshaf/eng-
dailydeal-tshaf 012754_8226372019614908324.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2003). In one
decision, the court cited errors in the Commission's economic analysis and in another it
said that the Commission had failed to prove that the deal would harm competition. Id.
It remains unclear whether these decisions will result in Commission's policy change.
By far the most important was the June 2002 decision by the Court of First Instance to
overturn the decision to block the merger of Airtours (now known as My Travel) with
rival First Choice. See Judges Overturn Airtours Merger Veto, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/business/2028882.stm The CFI rejected the Commission's application of the
merger's facts to the economic theory used to justify blocking the combination. See
European Court Makes it Difficult for Commission to Block Mergers, at http://
www.ashursts.com/pubs/pdf/2228.pdf.
335. Cf. Dispute Settlement, supra note 331, art. 2, 17 (The Dispute Settlement Body
and Appellate Body are permanent organs of the WTO).
336. This is similar to the ICN's policy of not having a permanent secretariat. See
International Competition Network, Memorandum on the Establishment and Operation
of the International Competition Network 3, at http://www.internationalcompetition
network.org/mou.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003) [hereinafter ICN Memorandum].
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ing recommendations. See Konrad von Finckenstein, Q.C., Recent Developments in the
International Competition Network, Address at the 2003 Forum on International Com-
petition Law-Hands on in Antitrust Heaven: Current Global Issues and Dilemmas (Feb.
6, 2003), at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/news/feb62003.html
(last visited Oct. 15, 2003) [hereinafter von Finckenstein Speech]. The ICN would only
act as an intermediary in providing the arbitrator. The decision is actually binding
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months.339 If the arbitrator believes the Commission's case that bundling
is a serious threat to rivals, the merger would not be allowed to continue.
On the other hand, if it believes the American position that competition in
the aerospace sector is robust enough to support the merger of GE and
Honeywell and rejects the EU's economic theories, the merger would be
able to proceed.
Two significant barriers to the proposal are obvious: consent from the
relevant sovereigns and the differing standards in various jurisdictions.
Consent, and in turn the legality of allowing a private body to effectuate
antitrust policy, may not be as impossible to obtain as it first seems. A
continuing complaint about many regulators is that they lack sufficient
economic training or competition policy experience to make optimal solu-
tions;340 indeed, this is a complaint that touches existing antitrust arbitra-
tion.341 By tying the arbitration process to the ICN, regulators are assured
that they are getting a decision maker who is at the forefront of competi-
tion policy as well as one who actually faces the difficulties of balancing
economic growth and consumer protection on a daily basis. In essence,
regulators would have two bites at the apple to vindicate their decision:
once in reaching it and again in defending it. Legality may also prove to be
a smaller hurdle than initially envisioned. In essence, an antitrust decision
is a decision to permit or deny a merger.342 That fundamental calculus
does not change if the decision is sent for arbitration. Most importantly,
the availability of post-merger remedies would not be foreclosed and regu-
lators would be free to demand future concessions should anticompetitive
behavior ultimately result. In the same vein, regulators could initially pro-
vide guidance on the decision they would make, including the reasoning
supporting it, with a final determination and decision coming only after
the arbitration process. This way, the decision results in nothing more
than a (possible) change to the regulator's initial decision and is akin to an
initial focus on one area of competition but a decision that ultimately deals
with another.343
339. The WTO indicates that the typical case referred to the Dispute Settlement Body
takes approximately one year to resolve but that appeals to the Appellate Body must be
resolved within sixty days. See Dispute Settlement, supra note 331. The arbitration I
propose is much closer to the WTO's appeals process because there has already been a
factual finding (the main work of the Dispute Settlement Body). Id. Two months would
allow the arbitrator to fully evaluate all arguments and preserves some expediency in the
merger process, which is likely already close to a year in length by the time it reaches the
arbitration panel. The GE/Honeywell deal was announced in October 2000 and for-
mally blocked by the EU in July 2001.
340. See Kolasky, supra note 19, at 26.
341. See Allison, supra note 310, at 244 (discussing the "perceived lack of arbitrator
expertise in dealing with antitrust claims").
342. Obviously, this is a gross generalization. Much of competition policy is made
"between the lines"; that is, through the artful regulatory process of deciding at just
what point competitors should be allowed to combine, what assets they must divest, and
what monitoring the merged entity should undergo.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 160-163.
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Key to this entire process is the transitory and ultimately disfavored
role of the arbitrator. Arbitration should be seen as a last resort and
should not develop into a way for competition authorities to shirk the
heavy lifting of day-to-day regulatory policy. Antitrust must remain ulti-
mately guided by the regulators in each country if it is to retain its impor-
tant role in national economic policy.34 4 Regulators must never develop
the attitude that it is best to leave the hard decisions to politically unac-
countable arbitration, and this will be a continuing tension. Limiting the
number of arbitrations is too simplistic and unnecessarily punishes com-
panies that happen to merge near the end of a regulatory cycle. Instead,
the ICN and the various regulatory bodies must make firm, good faith
commitments to effective negotiation outside the arbitration process. This
may require the ICN to decline an arbitration request if it cannot determine
that regulators made sufficient efforts to come to a decision. Thus, the
other roles of the ICN-those of dialogue and best practices3 4 5 -remain as
important, if not more so, than its role as arbitrator.
In the end, the ICN's role in this process cannot be underestimated. If
the ICN is truly able to bring competition officials, members of the private
bar, businesspeople, academics, and representatives of international orga-
nizations together, as is envisioned, it may be able to develop fundamental
guidelines for merger review out of the cacophony of voices that are its
membership.3 46 As guiding principles for merger analysis emerge from
these discussions, the arbitrator could rely on these policies in examining
the evidence submitted by both sides. A merger would be approved or
rejected based on the current "best thinking" of competition officials from
around the globe.
3 4 7
Yet, the ICN process moves slowly. In June 2003, the ICN held its
annual meeting in Merida, Mexico, at which it adopted four new recom-
mended practices dealing with review, notification, and transparency. 3 48
Unfortunately, like much of the output of consensus-based nongovernmen-
tal bodies, these recommended practices are often more show than sub-
stance: the recommendation on transparency, for example, was that merger
control laws be applied transparently.3 49 This is certainly a useful ideal
and will help to develop competition policy, but the ICN must take bolder
steps if it, unlike its competition policy forbearers, is to succeed. Agreeing
to provide more than just suggestions to achieve its goals of law conver-
gence is just such a step.
344. See von Finckenstein Speech, supra note 337 (noting that "competition law is
national but commerce is increasingly global").
345. See id.
346. See James, supra note 58, at 26-27.
347. In this sense, the ICN would be similar to the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws.
348. Press Release, Department of Justice, Assistant Attorney General R. Hewitt Pate
Promotes Merger Process Reform at International Competition Network Conference in
Merida, Mexico (June 26, 2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/
2003/201115.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
349. See id.
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Arbitration allows a neutral third party to evaluate the economic evi-
dence before a merger is abandoned and decide which side has the better
argument. The hypothetical arbitrator would have been called upon only
one time since 1990, for GE/Honeywell. Thus, this process would be a
rarely used safety valve-as it should be. This may also have the added
benefit of pushing both the United States and the EU toward law harmoni-
zation through the ICN, with the ultimate goal of a merger investigation
reaching substantially the same outcome in both jurisdictions. If the ICN
is successful, arbitration could be little more than a temporary bridge as
the competition laws of various jurisdictions slowly come together. As it
stands now, if the EU blocks a merger, it is some years before the Court of
First Instance hears the appeal. 350 The time frame is usually shorter in the
United States but still depends on the speed of the federal court system.35 1
Of course, if the arbitrator were to approve a merger, each nation would
still be free to use its ex post remedies if the merger generated completion
problems.
Conclusion
Antitrust policy is likely at a significant crossroads, and there is more
than a grain of truth in saying that "the way the world regulates
megamergers... is now decided largely in Europe."3 5 2 On one side are the
national economic interests that have always guided antitrust, which
remain as valid today as ever. On the other is the increasingly global
nature of business and the need for companies to continue to expand to
meet the new challenges this brings. Couple these with the varying sub-
stantive standards in different jurisdictions-or, at the very least, different
substantive ways of looking at mergers-and the waters become even murk-
ier. Arbitration is not the ideal solution for these conflicting interests, nor
is it the ideal solution to differing outcomes in merger review. Instead,
competition authorities must work together to develop uniform standards.
Unfortunately, history has shown this to be anything but an easy task. The
ICN's road, while promising, is a long and difficult one. That said, its suc-
cess or failure will likely have an enormous impact on competition policy
for years to come.
Thus, arbitration may be able to step into the void created between the
current reality of uncertainty and a future of smooth, uniform laws. By
allowing the ICN and the ideas developed by its members to play a substan-
tive role in the competition debate years or decades earlier than they other-
wise might, regulators can see the real and tangible benefits to working
closer together. As these outcomes are accepted, grudgingly or enthusiasti-
cally, the promise of harmonization can begin to become a reality.
350. See Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 63, at 22.
351. See Kauper, supra note 30, at 314-15; see also James (Antitrust in the Early 21st
Century speech), supra note 14, at 13-14.
352. Rich Thomas, The Amazing Euroman, NEWSWEEK, July 9, 2001, at 20, available at
LEXIS, News Library.
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As the world's economy becomes evermore integrated, it seems only
appropriate that there be something more than vague promises and the
hope that antitrust analysis might one day converge. Europe and the
United States remain some ways apart in their attitudes toward competi-
tion, despite claims to the contrary. This divergence is neither intellectu-
ally nor ideologically defensible. When one regulatory agency is able to
block a merger on questionable reasoning and novel theories, there is the
real potential for consumers to be the ultimate victims. There must be
something to move us beyond the untenable status quo so that when a
future Jack Welch announces a merger, he has a good idea of where the
regulatory process will take him.

